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“Of course it would have been better for all concerned . . . if [plaintiff 
patent holder] Mr. Lough had read our prior opinions before he be-
came an inventor. . . .”1
  INTRODUCTION   
 
Who does read patent law? Not Steven Lough, in all likeli-
hood. He was a boat mechanic working at a marina in Sara-
sota, Florida. After observing that the stern drives of Bruns-
wick inboard/outboard boats frequently failed due to corrosion, 
he designed a new seal assembly and built six prototypes using 
his grandfather’s metal lathe.2 He installed one of the proto-
types on his own boat and gave the others away.3 Eventually he 
got a patent, and when Brunswick introduced a stern drive 
having an allegedly similar seal assembly, Lough sued for in-
fringement. He won a jury verdict, but the Federal Circuit 
overturned it on appeal, concluding that Lough’s patent should 
have been held invalid because Lough had put the prototypes 
into public use more than a year before filing his patent appli-
cation.4 According to the panel majority, Lough had neglected 
to keep adequate documentation that might have helped him 
prove that he was merely testing the seal assembly to deter-
mine whether it worked.5 Of course, as Judge S. Jay Plager 
caustically remarked, prior to building the prototypes, Lough 
had presumably not mastered the jurisprudence of the experi-
mental use negation of the public use bar to patentability.6
 
 1. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(Plager, J., dissenting). 
 
 2. Id. at 1115–16. 
 3. Id. at 1116. 
 4. Id. at 1122 (invoking 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1124 (Plager, J., dissenting). It still isn’t clear whether the Fed-
eral Circuit as a whole had mastered it, either. See Lough v. Brunswick Corp, 
103 F.3d 1517, 1517–18 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (order denying rehearing en banc, ac-
companied by separate opinion of Judge Lourie in support of the order and 
four opinions from Judges Newman, Plager, Michel, and Rader, respectively, 
dissenting from the order). In any event, Judge Lourie’s opinion for the panel 
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In truth, we think it would be only a mild exaggeration to 
assert that no one actually reads the patent law in its raw 
state. Really, who would? In the nineteenth century, it was not 
unusual for popular newspapers or magazines to report at 
length on patent decisions, ostensibly for an idealized reader-
ship of ingenious Yankee mechanics or yeoman farmers.7 Per-
haps the notion of the paradigmatic informed citizen inventor 
was always a caricature,8 or perhaps times and reading habits 
have changed. Regardless, it is at best a fond Jeffersonian con-
ceit to suggest that modern research scientists pass their days 
poring through the prodigious output of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit—or that they have a clear notion 
of who or what the court even is. Moreover, the obvious retort—
that modern patent professionals read the patent law and re-
transmit the text to their clients—raises additional questions, 
and assumes (incorrectly, we think) that patent professionals 
actually do get their patent law predominantly from source ma-
terials, rather than from intermediaries.9
The fact is that patent law is probably much more remote 
from its putative end users than patent law rhetoric conven-
tionally admits. Two types of problems result. First, remoteness 
complicates patent law’s ex ante incentives story. In the tradi-
tional version of the story, patent law incents inventors’ actual 
decisions about whether to work on inventions, or inventors’ 
decisions to disclose them,
  
10
 
majority in Lough insisted that “[t]he law does not waive statutory require-
ments for inventors of lesser sophistication.” Lough, 86 F.3d at 1122. 
 and patent rulemaking is an exer-
 7. See Mark D. Janis, Daniel Webster ’s Patent Cases 8 (Sept. 25, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (citing press coverage of patent 
litigation involving Goodyear’s patent for vulcanized rubber).  
 8. See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 899, 904–22 (2002) (alluding to the “heroic inventor” motif of nineteenth 
century patent law); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 709, 712–14 (2012) (arguing that most inventions are made by 
multiple teams working concurrently). 
 9. There is a parallel set of questions about who (if anyone) actually 
reads the text of patent documents. The answers are important for many pa-
tent law doctrines, and we think it problematic simply to assume a homogene-
ous audience of enlightened inventors. Justice Breyer may have indulged in 
such an assumption in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012) (“[T]he ‘administering’ step simply refers to the 
relevant audience, namely doctors who treat patients with certain diseases 
with thiopurine drugs . . . . [T]hese clauses tell the relevant audience about the 
[natural] laws while trusting them to use those laws appropriately where they 
are relevant to their decisionmaking.”).  
 10. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–30 
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cise in intricately sculpting those incentives to create a perfect 
fit with the overriding normative and constitutional goal of 
promoting progress in the useful arts.11
Second, patent law’s remoteness presents serious challeng-
es for the design of the patent system’s institutions and rules. 
It creates great pressure on the system to develop intermediar-
ies that can function to refine the formal patent law so that its 
audience can receive a comprehensible essence. It creates pres-
sure to perfect those intermediaries so as to minimize the 
chance that they will introduce translation errors. And it sug-
gests that in elaborating patent law rules, Congress, the courts, 
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
need a better understanding of the composition of the intended 
audience, and need to understand how and when to invoke the 
intermediaries that may connect rule to audience. 
 But that account as-
sumes that the law’s incentives actually are communicated, in 
some form, to inventors. If modern patent law is all but incom-
prehensible to inventors, then who does receive patent law’s 
messages about incentives? How are those messages rebroad-
cast to inventors? How certain are we that the subtleties of pat-
ent law’s putative incentive effects are not lost in translation?  
In this paper, we argue that the patent law could operate 
more effectively if it (1) incorporated a more realistic conception 
of its audience, and (2) devised pragmatic mechanisms—
intermediaries—to bridge the distance between formal patent 
law rules and the targeted audience for those rules. In Part I, 
we synthesize literature pertinent to the general problem of de-
signing law in view of the relevant audience. We identify and 
define two considerations that guide this design exercise, prox-
imity and complexity, and offer a simple matrix to illustrate the 
proximity/complexity tradeoff in the design of rules. In the re-
mainder of the paper, we turn to patent law. In Part II, we con-
ceptualize the patent system as a complex network involving a 
multiplicity of speakers, intermediaries, and audiences. Among 
other things, we use this network metaphor to show that many 
patent rules lack proximity to their putative audience. In light 
of that observation, in Part III, we reevaluate specific patent 
law doctrines in view of the proximity/complexity tradeoff, of-
 
(1989) (explaining the incentive to invent and incentive to disclose theories). 
In another incarnation, the patent right encourages investors to fund innova-
tion. Id. at 1036–38.  
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing that one of the powers of Con-
gress is to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts”). 
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fering our own normative choices about how proximity and 
complexity might be rebalanced in the design—or redesign—of 
particular patent law rules.  
I.  DESIGNING LEGAL RULES IN VIEW OF AUDIENCE 
INTERESTS   
Law must communicate to be effective. That proposition is 
intuitive; restating it may seem trite. A legal regime (such as 
patent law) may be understood as a communication system, one 
in which rulemaking institutions broadcast messages, adjudi-
cative institutions interpret and retransmit them to stakehold-
ers, and stakeholders act based on the rules and deliver feed-
back, ultimately to the rulemaking institutions.12 This 
observation, likewise, is probably trivial. Virtually anything in 
modern experience can be conceptualized as information and 
situated in a network where information flows from one node to 
another and is processed, refined, or distorted.13
Obvious though it may be, the network metaphor could en-
rich traditional legal analysis by expanding its perspective. 
Traditional legal analysis focuses exquisite attention on design-
ing rules, and, perhaps, on designing institutions to promulgate 
and interpret those rules. It has paid far less attention to the 
mechanisms by which rules are transmitted—or not—to their 
ultimate target audiences.
 
14
 
 12. See Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, Studying Law by Association: Bru-
no Latour Goes to the Conseil D’Etat, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 805, 806 (2008) 
(observing that Latour’s work “treats law as a network of people and of things 
in which legality is not a field to be studied independently, but is instead a 
way in which the world is assembled”); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A 
Map of Misreading: Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. LAW & 
SOC. 279, 299 (1987) (characterizing law as a “network of legal orders”); see 
also Dan L. Burk, Law as a Network Standard, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 63, 72 
(2005) (exploring law’s network effects); infra Part II (applying these concepts 
to the patent system). 
 Traditional legal analysis at its 
 13. See, e.g., JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A HISTORY, A THEORY, A 
FLOOD 8–9 (2011) (“Life spreads by networking.”). 
 14. For simplicity, we are referring to “audience” as any entity that re-
ceives a message, whether directly or indirectly. In doing so, we are taking 
some liberties with terminology. Linguists define the “addressee” as the entity 
directly receiving the communication and the “audience” as the collective set of 
entities for whom the communication is ultimately intended. Drury Stevenson, 
To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 116–17 (2003). 
Some scholars have found it useful to subdivide the audience even further. 
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audi-
ence, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (2003) (defining auditors, overhearers, and 
eavesdroppers). 
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most myopic obsesses over nodes, discounting the fact that 
those nodes exist in a complex and, perhaps, dynamic net-
worked system that may involve a multitude of participants 
who experience the system in dramatically different ways. 
Our interest in the audience perspective is pragmatic. We 
leave for others the larger jurisprudential implications.15
With this goal in mind, we have examined literature apply-
ing principles of sociolinguistics,
 We 
seek a diagnostic tool for identifying design problems in the pa-
tent law system and for guiding efforts to address those prob-
lems. We suspect that other areas of law may benefit from a 
similar treatment, but such extrapolations fall outside the 
scope of our work here.  
16 network science,17 and in-
formation theory to law, and we have taken account of more 
traditional scholarly endeavors in areas such as property theo-
ry, all to develop a conception of the role of audience in the de-
sign of legal systems. Based on this study, we have defined two 
rudimentary design parameters. We refer to the first as prox-
imity, a measure of the extent to which formal law communi-
cates directly to its putative audience. We call the second com-
plexity, to refer to the extent of information that a formal legal 
rule attempts to convey. We can order these parameters in a 
simple two-by-two matrix to illustrate how they interact in the 
design of any individual legal rule. In this section we explain 
our concepts of proximity and complexity, along with the prox-
imity/complexity matrix that frames our analysis.18
A. PROXIMITY 
 
Formal law sometimes communicates directly with those 
bound by it. Consider, for example, a speed limit sign displayed 
on a public road. The rule of law is communicated directly to 
 
 15. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial In-
terpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 563–65 (1989) (treating legisla-
tive rulemaking as a process of communication and asking whether the legis-
lature can engage in audience pre-selection and preparation). 
 16. See generally Stevenson, supra note 14, at 116–23 (discussing socio-
linguistic features of written legal formulas). 
 17. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of 
Networks: An Overview and an Application to the “Patent Explosion,” 21 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293 (2006) (applying a network science perspective to 
patent law). 
 18. For purposes of this initial discussion we are treating audience as an 
empirical fact. Later we discuss the possibility of treating audience prescrip-
tively, as another variable in the design of rules. See infra Part III. 
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the relevant audience, car drivers. The legal text is literally 
spelled out for the ultimate audience and presented in such a 
manner that no specialized expertise is required in order to dis-
cover the text. We could characterize such a rule by saying that 
there is little distance between the speaker (the state) and the 
audience (the drivers).19
Such direct communication of the law to the relevant audi-
ence does not always occur. Often, parties bound by formal le-
gal rules have never read the texts, may not know where to find 
them or how to read them if they could find them, and see little 
need to do so in any event. In such instances, other mecha-
nisms forge an indirect connection between formal law and its 
audience. Background knowledge, norms, or customs may coin-
cide so closely with the formal law that actual recourse to the 
formal legal text would be redundant. For example, although 
most may not understand the subtle differences between mur-
der and homicide, everyone knows that taking the life of anoth-
er is a crime, absent some justification such as self-defense. The 
failure to read the statute that defines murder does not reduce 
the effectiveness of the law in enforcing the proscriptions on 
homicide.  
  
Alternatively, formal law may be communicated to its ul-
timate audience by way of intermediaries. Intermediaries may 
be individuals, institutions, or legal constructs. Perhaps the 
clearest example is the practicing bar. Lawyers “transmit[] the 
law in distilled form to the citizenry. They change the law from 
its original form . . . into ‘conduct rules’ addressed to the citi-
zen.”20
To capture the notion of a degree of separation between the 
entity promulgating a formal legal rule and the audience tar-
 In some areas—such as patent law—the technical pre-
cepts of the law may not be rooted in background norms, or 
there may simply not be very many of them on which to rely. 
Thus, for designing the patent law system, it is critical to de-
velop intermediaries and situate them in such a way as to facil-
itate efficient dissemination of the formal rules or, as we dis-
cuss in more detail in the next section, elaborate legal 
constructs to help translate the law.  
 
 19. Of course, it is also important that the rule at issue is inherently sim-
ple. A placard posted outside a lab saying, “Warning—Do Not Infringe Pa-
tents” could also be argued to speak directly to its ultimate target audience, 
but the message may be too complex for that audience to decode under the cir-
cumstances. See infra Part I.B for an explanation. 
 20. Stevenson, supra note 14, at 147–48 (referring to criminal law). 
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geted by that rule, it may be useful to speak of a rule’s proximi-
ty to its audience.21 A legal rule that is distant from its audi-
ence may be subject to additional design constraints as com-
pared to a rule that is proximal to its audience. Indirectly, 
proximity may express information about the character of the 
audience. We might characterize a rule as being distant from 
its audience if the rule attempts to speak directly to the general 
public, especially in a context like patent law in which the gen-
eral public is unlikely to have internalized much background 
knowledge about the system and its rules and institutions.22
Proximity is important in legal regimes that impose legal 
obligations ergo omnes. Real property law furnishes a useful il-
lustration of this point, even though our focus in the remainder 
of the paper is patent law.
 We 
may also speak in institutional terms, of rulemaking institu-
tions that are generally distant from the audiences that they 
purport to target, such that the rules promulgated by those in-
stitutions will frequently present a proximity problem. For ex-
ample, bankruptcy law is directed to individuals, yet we do not 
realistically expect the general public to know the details of 
how bankruptcy works, aside from recognizing that it is an op-
tion for those whose debts exceed their assets. The debtor is ul-
timately quite remote from the law.  
23 Property is a form of communica-
tion, as Carol Rose has pointed out.24 As she puts it, 
“[l]anguage, in the broader sense of symbolism and communica-
tion, makes property possible”25
 
 21. A similar measure appearing in the literature of network sciences is 
the “closeness” metric. See, e.g., PETER R. MONGE & NOSHIR S. CONTRACTOR, 
THEORIES OF COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 38–39 (2003) (using a measure of 
“closeness” to evaluate an entity’s ability to access information through a net-
work, where closeness refers to the extent to which the entity is connected, di-
rectly or indirectly, to other entities in the network); see also id. at 223–39 
(discussing concepts of proximity in theories of social networks). 
 in that property claimants ar-
ticulate their claims, and others take notice of those claims and 
acquiesce in them. Similarly, Henry Smith has explained that 
the efficient operating of property regimes requires that a dif-
 22. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 23. Criminal law presents another striking example. Vast segments of it 
are relevant to everyone’s general daily affairs, and most people substantially 
abide by it without ever consulting or comprehending the actual text. Under 
one view, instrumentalities of the state serve as intermediaries, bridging the 
gap between the text and those bound by it. See Stevenson, supra note 14, at 
167. 
 24. See Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost 
of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3 (2006). 
 25. Id. 
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fuse audience understand the communicative message embod-
ied in a claim to property rights.26 To restate these assertions, 
property claims, and the rules that construct those claims, of-
ten will not have the benefit of close proximity, because often 
those property claims and rules must speak to a diverse audi-
ence having no necessary prior relationship with the property 
claimant. The problem may be especially acute in intellectual 
property, where little in the way of customary practice or other 
contextual clues are available to guide public behavior.27
B. COMPLEXITY  
  
As even the most casual student of the law well knows, 
some legal rules are easier to decode than others. Above, we ob-
served that the ease with which this process can occur is, in 
part, a function of the proximity of the intended audience to the 
institution promulgating the rule. Here, we note that the ease 
of decoding should also be a function of the rule’s inherent 
complexity. 
We regard this as another largely obvious proposition that 
borrows elementary insights from information theory. In in-
formation-theoretic terms, any networked communication sys-
tem should take into account the sheer quantity of information 
 
 26. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and 
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1117–22 (2003) (discussing rules of posses-
sion and context needed for the audience to understand them). For example, in 
the classic case of Pierson v. Post, adoption of the “reasonable prospect of 
catching” rule for possession of the hunted fox requires knowledge of the con-
text of the hunt, in contrast to the clearer, non-contextual rule of “certain con-
trol.” Id. at 1117–18. 
 27. One key contextual clue that intellectual property lacks is tangibility. 
While owners of real property—and the rest of us who must abide by the laws 
of property on a daily basis—may not know the real difference between a life 
estate and a fee simple absolute, we do know that the relevant property rights 
are tethered to some “thing”—the land—and there may be abundant physical 
signs that corroborate a claim of rights in that thing—say, fences. In contrast, 
intellectual property, and patents in particular, do not have such tangibility to 
anchor the owner’s instincts or knowledge of the rights and requirements. 
Moreover, unlike real property, the scope of a patent’s right to exclude shifts 
over time, further complicating the audience’s task of decoding the relevant 
rules. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into 
After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Mean-
ing, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 493 (2008); Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” 
Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 
174 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession 
Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15–29 (2009). 
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contained in a message per unit cost of delivery.28 For purposes 
of applying this idea to legal information, information quantity 
may be too crude a concept, given that the information in a le-
gal rule cannot be assumed to be divisible into substituents 
that are simply fungible. We prefer to use the label complexity. 
A highly complex rule, as we define it, is difficult to decode, but 
this presents little concern if the relevant audience is small and 
expert. It presents greater concern as the audience becomes 
large and more diverse in its abilities and familiarity with the 
legal regime at issue.29
We do not mean to pretend that the concept of complexity 
as we have defined it is comprehensive, nor do we intend to in-
voke theories of complexity that have been applied to explain 
the evolution of law.
 
30
Although he does not use the term “complexity,” Henry 
Smith’s discussion of the tradeoff between information inten-
siveness and audience extensiveness helps us illustrate what 
we mean by rule complexity and its connection with audience.
 We simply mean to suggest that complex-
ity is a handy tool for the immediate task. 
31 
Smith contrasts contract and property.32 Contract provisions, 
Smith asserts, can convey large amounts of information per 
unit costs because the audience—the parties to the contract—is 
very small, expert, related (by virtue of having negotiated the 
contract), and fully aware of the relevant context.33 The parties, 
knowing the context, will be able to take more information ac-
curately from fewer words, even if those words are idiosyncrat-
ic.34
 
 28. See Smith, supra note 
 These conditions, the argument goes, do not exist with re-
gards to property claims, and so property rules cannot convey 
26, at 1110–11 (referring to information inten-
siveness: the amount of information per unit cost of delineation). 
 29. We see some connections between our notion of rule complexity and 
the debate over rules versus standards. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rules v. 
Standards for Patent Law in the Plant Sciences, 24 LAW IN CONTEXT 44, 48–50 
(2006) (one of many works showing how the debate may be relevant in intel-
lectual property law). 
 30. See J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to De-
scribe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democ-
racy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1437–48 (1996) (exploring the relevance of com-
plexity theory). 
 31. Smith, supra note 26, at 1111. 
 32. Id. at 1110–11. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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the same information intensity—or complexity, in our lan-
guage.35
We agree with this comparison as far as it goes, but we can 
extend the contract discussion to show why both complexity 
and proximity are important. Suppose that the contract is not a 
bilateral, negotiated agreement, but a click-wrap license on a 
software product. The audience is no longer (necessarily) small, 
expert, related, or immersed in the relevant context. The terms 
of the contract may be the same as those in the former exam-
ple—that is, they may have the same complexity—but the au-
dience is no longer as proximal to the source of the contract 
provisions.
 
36
C. THE PROXIMITY/COMPLEXITY TRADEOFF 
 Both proximity and complexity matter in design-
ing the relevant rule.  
Having defined the concepts of proximity and complexity 
as we intend to use them here, we now show how, at a general 
level, those variables interact in the design of rules. Our cen-
tral proposal here is simple: in the design of legal rules, there is 
a tradeoff between proximity and complexity. Rulemaking ex-
ercises that ignore this tradeoff are not likely to produce rules 
that operate as intended.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35. See id. Smith goes further, suggesting a contrast between rule formal-
ism and rule contextualism, where formalism signals a condition of low infor-
mation-carrying capacity and is called for in property, while highly contextual-
ized rules work in contracts. Id. at 1112. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–9 (2000) (asserting that more 
formal systems are needed in order to make property rules accessible). But 
formalism carries much extraneous intellectual baggage, and we don’t think it 
illuminates our inquiry on balance, although there is an interesting juxtaposi-
tion with patent law literature criticizing the Federal Circuit’s reliance on 
bright-line rules. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 
AM. L. REV. 771, 773–75 (2003).  
 36. We can imagine other contingencies. For example, third parties may 
be affected by the contract and thus may be part of the relevant audience. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The figure demonstrates the relationship between rule com-
plexity and speaker-audience proximity. 
 
Our central focus here is on rules that fall into Quadrant 
IV—that is, rules that purport to convey highly complex con-
tent to a distant (low proximity) audience. Those rules are can-
didates for redesign. They need either to be restructured to re-
duce their complexity (moving them towards Quadrant II), or 
they need to be keyed to take advantage of intermediaries, or 
keyed to invoke other sorts of heuristics, to increase the effec-
tive proximity (moving them towards Quadrant III).37 As we 
will argue below, patent law includes too many Quadrant IV 
rules.38
Our framework is directed to individual rules; it presumes 
that any given area of law may include rules that populate dif-
ferent quadrants. For example, in patent law, the USPTO has 
promulgated regulations that spell out with considerable speci-
ficity the DNA sequence information that a patent applicant 
must supply in order to comply with the patent law’s general 
disclosure requirements for patent claims directed to isolated 
genes or other DNA inventions.
 
39
 
 37. Or both, which may place them in the domain of Quadrant I. 
 These regulations are Quad-
rant III rules in our framework: they are highly technical in 
content (and thus may be considered highly complex) but they 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801–1.821 (2011).  
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are directed to a small circle of biotechnology patent profes-
sionals (and so are highly proximal to their intended audience, 
with little or no need for comprehensive transmission to a more 
diffuse, general audience). Many other patent law rules are 
Quadrant IV rules, or are candidates to become Quadrant IV 
rules because rulemakers are insufficiently sensitive to proxim-
ity and complexity.  
II.  MAPPING THE MODERN PATENT SYSTEM: 
AUDIENCE AND THE PROXIMITY/COMPLEXITY 
TRADEOFF   
Our ultimate goal is to apply the concept of audience, and 
particularly the idea of the proximity/complexity tradeoff, to 
the design of patent law rules. The next step towards that goal 
is to provide a descriptive account of patent law’s audience. We 
find that patent law’s audience is rich, complex, and varied. We 
reject the notion that patent law’s audience, as a descriptive 
matter, is a select and homogeneous group of sophisticates. We 
also reject the notion that patent law’s audience is essentially 
passive. Instead, we see patent law’s stakeholders as residing 
within a complex network in which stakeholders may receive 
information (in the form of legal rules), retransmit it to others, 
and/or provide feedback to the institutions responsible for 
propagating the rules. We find it convenient to refer to the 
rhetoric of networks in rendering this description. The early 
American patent system provides a useful contrast to the mod-
ern system, so we turn briefly to it before depicting the modern 
system. 
A. AUDIENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM  
Many of the rules of modern patent law, including many 
that will persist after the America Invents Act of 2011 comes 
into full effect, were developed in the early nineteenth century. 
In one standard rendition, now dismissed as mythical, the en-
tire American patent system connected in some way to the per-
sona of Thomas Jefferson: he had (it was said) written the leg-
islation that became America’s first patent act;40
 
 40. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966) (naming Jef-
ferson as a drafter of the Patent Act of 1790 as well as its “moving spirit”). See 
generally Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790). 
 he examined 
the early patent applications (or at least had been authorized to 
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do so); and, by all accounts, he was keenly interested in inven-
tion.41
While the early American patent system was more than a 
mere Jeffersonian soliloquy, the stakeholders were indeed few. 
Two judges and a select group of lawyers handled virtually all 
patent litigation.
  
42 There was no Patent Office, no formal pa-
tent bar, and only a few entrepreneurs whose products were 
likely to be distributed on a commercial scale.43 The diagram 
below portrays the system: Congress and a small subset of the 
judiciary (along with one treatise writer) served as the primary 
source of rules,44 and a select group of lawyers and inventors 
constituted the audience, although they also provided some 
feedback.45
 
 We have not included the general public on the dia-
gram. The general public had a stake in the early patent sys-
tem—at a minimum, they were bound to respect patent rights, 
so infringement rules were relevant to them. But given the lim-
ited nature of the industrial economy, few among the general 
public would have been engaged in activities that would have 
exposed them to large-scale patent infringement liability risks. 
 
 41. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7–10 (valorizing Jefferson’s contributions to 
the early patent system). But cf. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jef-
ferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Histori-
cal Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 955 (2007) (refuting the “Jeffersonian 
story” of early patent law); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of 
History: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson’s Influence on 
the Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195, 217 (1999) (explaining Jefferson’s relatively 
modest role in early patent law development). 
 42. See Janis, supra note 7, at 5–6 (explaining that the jurisdictional or-
ganization of the federal courts combined with the “geographic concentration 
of manufacturing and technical innovation in New England and the Mid-
Atlantic states” resulted in most of the country’s patent cases being heard by 
either Justice Joseph Story or Justice Bushrod Washington). 
 43. See generally Andrew P. Morriss & Craig A. Nard, Institutional Choice 
& Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 149–79 (2011) (discussing the statutory, doctrinal, 
and socio-economic evolution of the antebellum patent law system). 
 44. For clarity, we have identified this group of legal “speakers” together, 
as indicated by the dashed oval. We have included one early treatise writer, 
Willard Phillips, to make the point that at the time, there was no systematic 
practice of reporting cases, so treatise writers played a major role in conveying 
information about case decisions. The relevant treatise is WILLARD PHILLIPS, 
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS (Boston, Am. Stationers, Co. 1837).  
 45. In the diagram we use the reverse arrows to indicate feedback. An il-
lustration of the feedback from inventors to legal “speakers” may be found in 
Walterscheid, supra note 41, at 207–08 (discussing a petition from an inventor 
protesting proposed changes to the Patent Act of 1790 presented before the 
House in early 1791).  
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In the early patent law landscape that we have depicted, 
there was little risk of a proximity problem. Indeed, the charac-
teristics of the early American patent system are reminiscent of 
the conditions that network theorists attribute to the so-called 
“small-world model.”46
B. AUDIENCE IN THE MODERN PATENT SYSTEM: UNFAVORABLE 
PROXIMITY FOR COMPLEX RULES? 
 This was the landscape in which some 
important patentability rules developed—e.g., rules governing 
certain aspects of patentability over the prior art. Those rules 
remain in effect today, even though a map of the modern sys-
tem differs greatly from this one, as we detail in the next sec-
tion. 
Most observers would readily agree that the modern Amer-
ican patent system is profoundly different from its nineteenth 
century predecessor.47 The difference of greatest salience to the 
discussion in this Article is the difference in proximity. Al-
though many of the patent system’s rules still purport to affect 
directly the investment decisions of inventors,48
 
 46. See, e.g., M.E.J. Newman & D.J. Watts, Scaling and Percolation in the 
Small-World Network Model, in THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NET-
WORKS 310, 310 (Mark Newman et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that in such a 
model, most entities are connected by a short path through the network, and 
there is high “transitivity,” meaning a high probability that there is a high 
likelihood that two entities are connected given their common connection to a 
third entity).  
 inventors are 
no longer as proximate to the formal law or the law-making in-
stitutions. Innovators rarely interact directly with the formal 
law. Instead, they interact with the law through intermediar-
 47. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 7, at 1 (contrasting the antebellum patent 
system and economy with the sophisticated institutions and corporations that 
are the hallmarks of the modern patent system).  
 48. We refer here to investment decisions of many varieties—financial re-
sources, time, efforts, etc. 
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ies—and very likely through multiple layers of intermediaries. 
The diagram below attempts to illustrate these ideas:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram reflects the growing institutional complexity 
of the patent system, a phenomenon that compounds the inher-
ent rule complexity of many individual patent law rules. Many 
of the institutional stakeholders have become more internally 
complicated over time,49
The diagram does offer a view as to the composition of 
modern patent law’s audience. It includes, first, the patent bar 
and a growing range of bloggers, academics, and journalists, all 
of whom receive and retransmit the law. They are particularly 
important intermediaries in our depiction of the system. If, as 
we suspect, many lawyers receive the law primarily via these 
sources rather than by reading the actual opinions (that is, if 
we are overly optimistic in drawing a direct line of connection 
between the patent bar and the entities that promulgate formal 
patent law), then these sources are critical to the transmission 
of the law.
 and their relationships with each other 
are likewise increasingly complex. And the diagram barely does 
justice to the actual institutional complexity of the system; it is 
not comprehensive.  
50
 
 49. For example, the diagram represents the USPTO as a single node, but 
in fact the USPTO is a large and complicated organization that must frequent-
ly mediate between competing internal interests.  
 Regardless, for any given rule of patent law, it may 
 50. Some may argue that we give too prominent a role to patent law aca-
demics in this depiction. That may be true, but we are academics and we ask 
forgiveness if we have a grandiose view of our own importance in the patent 
law landscape. In our depiction, the nodes representing both the patent bar 
and bloggers, academics, and journalists have high “betweenness,” meaning 
that a large number of paths in the network pass through these nodes. See 
generally MONGE & CONTRACTOR, supra note 21, at 38. 
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be reasonable to assert that the immediate audience is the au-
dience of expert lawyers and commentators, even though the 
rule purports to be keyed directly to the inventor. 
The diagram also includes other actors—venture capital-
ists, corporate management responsible for research and devel-
opment funding decisions—and the actual system no doubt in-
cludes many others, all of whom may well have a role in 
filtering and repackaging the law to make it digestible by in-
ventors. We think it incorrect to assume that entities such as 
these are not, or should not be, a part of patent law’s target au-
dience. Yet, at least on the surface, patent law rules seem to be 
made based on the assumption that the message embedded in 
those rules will be delivered without alteration to the ultimate, 
less proximate target audience of scientists and engineers.  
We recognize that it would be easy to quarrel with the de-
tails of the diagram. The entities could be arrayed differently, 
some subtracted, others added; the arrows indicating the inter-
connections could be rearranged. But that quarrel simply high-
lights our point: the patent system relies heavily on intermedi-
aries, but these intermediaries are not necessarily formalized 
or vetted. Moreover, the landscape is dynamic—the picture 
changes over time, sometimes quite rapidly. In addition, the in-
stitutional actors may differ in identity, and certainly in im-
portance, across different areas of technology.51
Our diagram is deliberately incomplete in one respect: it 
does not portray the “general public” per se as occupying any 
discrete node in the diagram. We hesitate to confine the gen-
eral public to a single node—the risk is too great of minimizing 
the role of the general public as the ultimate stakeholder in the 
system, and it may be too difficult to represent with simple ar-
rows the channels through which legal information about pa-
tents is transmitted to the general public. As we will point 
out,
  
52
 
 51. This is another manifestation of the familiar point that patent law is, 
or is becoming, technology-specific. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1589–95 (2003).  
 however, the design of some patent law rules must take 
into account the prospect of the general public as the putative 
audience. Indeed, some current patent law rules encounter a 
severe proximity problem because they purport to convey pro-
scriptions to the general public. The problem arises in connec-
 52. See infra Part III.A.  
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tion with a number of patent infringement doctrines, as we dis-
cuss in the next section.53
III.  REDESIGNING PATENT LAW IN VIEW OF AUDIENCE   
 
Consideration of law’s audience should be an important 
tool in designing any formal legal regime. In the patent context, 
where concerns of public notice drive much of the doctrine, a 
rich inquiry into the appropriate audience for particular patent 
rules is critical. The proximity/complexity metric we offer in 
this Article provides a straightforward basis for assessing the 
efficacy of patent doctrine, one which the courts or Congress 
could use in shaping individual patent rules. If the patent sys-
tem is to operate appropriately, then policymakers should at-
tempt to shift individual patent law rules out of Quadrant IV 
by either using a bridging heuristic to reduce the distance be-
tween the speaker and the audience or by simplifying the rules 
to reduce complexity.54
This section highlights certain patent rules that could ben-
efit most from a reassessment under our framework. We begin 
with doctrines of patent scope. These rules determine the ex-
tent of the patent owner’s right to exclude. These doctrines, 
therefore, operate to establish a patent’s intangible “fence,” and 
thus directly implicate public notice concerns.  
 A considered evaluation of audience, 
therefore, provides a useful tool by which lawmakers could re-
form patent law.  
Patent scope doctrines are generally complex, but yet they 
purport to speak to the general public. As our framework pre-
dicts, such doctrines are problematic; they do not respect the 
 
 53. As patents and the patent system become more salient in everyday 
life, we can expect to see a broader discourse about the disconnect between the 
general public and the institutions of the patent system. Regarding increased 
salience, see, for example, Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Cop-
yright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 487–88 (2004) (“Patented nonparadigmatic goods 
such as business methods or sports moves, by contrast, affect a larger number 
of observers.”). See also Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercializa-
tion, and Intellectual Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 410–11 (2008) 
(highlighting the media coverage of a heart disease drug patented for use sole-
ly in African Americans); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Pa-
tents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 579 (2006) (arguing that patents have the po-
tential to imply governmental preferences or disfavor towards some members 
of society, particularly in the biotechnology arena); Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing 
Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of Intellectual 
Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353, 360 (2007) (“The new com-
modity value of patented race depends on its ultimate relationship to the liv-
ing, breathing people who identify with particular racial groups.”). 
 54. See supra Part I.C. 
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proximity/complexity tradeoff. We show how the law has at-
tempted to respond: by developing constructed audiences to in-
crease the effective proximity between the rulemaking institu-
tions and the audience. Heuristics such as the hypothetical 
person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) and the 
“reasonable competitor” attempt to serve in this role, and we 
critically evaluate their performance. 
We then turn to patentability doctrines. Here, our analysis 
is more selective. We focus on longstanding rules of patentabil-
ity that bar inventors from patent protection based on their 
own prior disclosures or sales activities—the so-called statutory 
bars to patentability. We show that these rules suffer from a 
similar tradeoff problem: they purport to convey subtle incen-
tives (high complexity) directly to inventors (unfavorable or low 
proximity). A reassessment of these rules is in order, especially 
in view of the passage of new patent legislation, as we explain. 
A. THE PROXIMITY/COMPLEXITY PROBLEM WITH PATENT SCOPE 
DOCTRINES 
Patent scope doctrines suffer from a severe proximi-
ty/complexity problem. The proximity aspect of the problem is 
so fundamental that it occasions little contemporary comment. 
Patents operate in a manner that might be likened to statutes: 
all members of the public are subject to the exclusive rights of 
patents, regardless of whether they are actually aware of a giv-
en patent.55 Infringement is a strict liability tort, and ignorance 
of a patent offers no protection from liability.56 As such, at least 
in theory, every member of the population is a potential in-
fringer, and there is a paramount need to provide notice to the 
general public of the boundaries of any given patent grant.57
The complexity problem is all too familiar to the patent 
community. One of the most difficult aspects of patent law is 
determining the scope of the right to exclude afforded by the 
  
 
 55  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 56. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc., No. 2009–1372, 2012 WL 3764695 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) 
(per curiam). 
 57. To be sure, it may seem unlikely that an ordinary citizen would ever 
need to worry about the enforceable scope of a patent on, say, laboratory 
equipment for conducting large-scale genomics or industrial tools used for oil 
drilling. By contrast, patents that cover a customer’s interaction with a com-
mercial website might be pertinent to many of us. 
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patent. This complexity is due largely to the fact that a patent’s 
exclusionary right is linked to something intangible, the idea of 
the invention disclosed in the patent document, rather than 
something physical, such as land for real property or an object 
for most personal property. Ascertaining the scope of the patent 
is crucial to both the owner of the patent and to competitors. 
The owner wants to ensure that her patent covers her goods in 
the market, and competitors need to assess their freedom to op-
erate in a given market.  
While patent scope is inextricably tied to the patent docu-
ment itself, and particularly a patent’s claims, the reality is 
that an assessment of a patent’s right to exclude requires con-
sideration of a rather complex amalgam of doctrines, rules, and 
canons. Courts initially assess the scope of a patent by engag-
ing in claim construction, the process of providing definitions to 
disputed claim terms. In addition to claim construction, a pat-
entee is entitled to protection against anything viewed as 
equivalent to the claimed invention. In fact, as a result of the 
doctrine of equivalents, the scope of a patent actually changes 
over time, ensnaring later-developed technologies that are nev-
ertheless viewed as equivalent to the original invention.58 In re-
sponse to the uncertainty created by the doctrine of equiva-
lents, the courts have created a litany of doctrines that limit 
the scope of equivalents. Beyond the construction of the claims 
themselves, there are various acts that constitute infringement, 
including making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing 
the invention;59 actively inducing others to infringe;60 and con-
tributing to the infringement of others.61
 
 58. See Cotropia, supra note 
 Consequently, as-
sessing patent scope is notoriously difficult, requiring familiari-
27, at 176; Holbrook, supra note 27, at 29–30. 
For these reasons, while we agree with many of the insights by Clarisa Long, 
we reject her notion that courts play little role in determining the bounds of 
the exclusive right of a patent. See Long, supra note 53, at 499–500 (“While a 
court may interpret the language of the patent after it has been issued, the 
nature of the judicial inquiry is not to fine-tune the scope of the patent (or in-
deed to adjust the scope of the patent after the fact), but to examine the validi-
ty of each claim.”). It seems to us that courts do adjust the scope of the patent 
after the fact, both indirectly through claim construction and quite directly 
under the doctrine of equivalents. We are not as sanguine as Long that resort 
to the patent document alone can resolve questions of scope: some facility with 
the case law governing claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents, and re-
lated doctrines is required.  
 59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 60. Id. § 271(b). 
 61. Id. § 271(c). 
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ty not only with the disclosure of a given patent, but also with 
the various rules and doctrines that determine the extent of a 
patent’s exclusive rights.  
Commentators have suggested that the uncertainty sur-
rounding the scope of patents and the attendant lack of public 
notice are perhaps the most significant problems with patent 
law.62 Even though the courts, and the Federal Circuit in par-
ticular, have articulated a strong policy preference for certainty 
in order to effect adequate public notice,63 uncertainty remains 
a key point of contention. Perhaps to its detriment, the Federal 
Circuit has focused the bulk of its efforts in this area on ag-
grandizing power over patent scope at the appellate level.64 
This development, however, has resulted in little doctrinal evo-
lution, especially in the area of claim construction, as we detail 
below. Instead, the Federal Circuit has enforced what it views 
as correct claim constructions in an inscrutable fashion, pursu-
ant to its de novo review of this issue.65
 
 62. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 46–
52 (2008) (arguing that even sophisticated entities have been victims of the 
patent scope uncertainty and notice issues); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, 
Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 788 (2011). 
 
 63. See, e.g., In re Katz Interactive Call Processing, 639 F.3d 1303, 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (rejecting use of extrinsic evidence as “undermining the public notice 
function of patents”); PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 
F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining the “public notice” function as “the 
mechanism whereby the public learns which innovations are the subjects of 
the claimed invention, and which are in the public domain”); Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(en banc) (“[T]hat reason [for the narrowing amendment] should be discernible 
from the prosecution history record, if the public notice function of a patent 
and its prosecution history is to have significance.”); Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. 
Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider 
extrinsic evidence to rebut Warner-Jenkinson presumption because “the public 
notice function of the patent record would be undermined”); Johnson & John-
ston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(“The claims give notice both to the examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office during prosecution, and to the public at large, including potential 
competitors, after the patent has issued.”). 
 64. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–80 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 65. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (refusing to reconsider de novo review); 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(holding that claim construction is reviewed de novo on appeal). But see Re-
tractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); 
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (en banc) (declining en banc reconsideration of de novo review with sev-
eral dissents and concurrences).  
  
2012] PATENT LAW’S AUDIENCE 93 
 
Largely lost in this doctrinal debate over claim construc-
tion and related infringement doctrines is the audience per-
spective. We know that claim scope doctrines such as claim 
construction strive to provide notice at an extraordinary level of 
precision to the “public,” but the court has not accounted for the 
fact that its claim scope rules are likely to be recoded and re-
layed among multiple actors before ever reaching the “public,” 
if by that terminology we mean the general public that is tech-
nically bound by those scope rules. That is, the court in its 
claim scope jurisprudence has insisted on rules of supreme 
complexity, directed through a complex network of intermediar-
ies to a distant audience.  
The result is a difficult proximity/complexity problem. The 
audience perspective is useful not only for identifying the prob-
lem, but also for evaluating efforts to resolve it. Our discussions 
of individual scope doctrines in this section focus primarily on 
judicial efforts to create standards such as the PHOSITA or the 
“reasonable competitor” to frame certain claim scope inquiries. 
We can reconceptualize these standards as efforts to construct 
an audience that is more proximate to the rulemaking institu-
tion, and then offer some judgments about whether they have 
succeeded.  
1. Claim Construction: The PHOSITA as a Constructed 
Audience 
The set of rules most directly concerned with patent scope 
is, of course, the claim construction rules, collectively the pri-
mary mechanism by which courts elaborate the appropriate 
scope of the patent. Claim construction is central to nearly all 
aspects of patent law because it is relevant both in asserting 
whether a patent claim is invalid and whether it is infringed.66
No area of patent law has been the target of more criticism 
than the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence. An 
entire cottage industry of empirical and theoretical studies of 
 
As such, the claims and the accompanying set of legal rules for 
construing them are considered central to affording proper pub-
lic notice in the patent system.  
 
 66. See Retractable, 659 F.3d at 1370 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of 
petition for rehearing en banc) (“Claim construction is the single most im-
portant event in the course of a patent litigation. It defines the scope of the 
property right being enforced, and is often the difference between infringe-
ment and non-infringement, or validity and invalidity.”). 
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claim construction67 has developed in the years since the Su-
preme Court’s seminal decision in Markman v. Westview In-
struments Inc.68 The consistent theme among critics is that 
claim construction outcomes are too unpredictable. The Federal 
Circuit’s current practice of undertaking plenary review of 
claim construction on appeal has generated a regime of complex 
legal rules, and some would say that there has been little or no 
offsetting advancement of the notice function.69
For our purposes, a glimpse at some of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s claim construction rules suffices to illustrate their com-
plexity. The Federal Circuit has adopted the rule that, in order 
to construe a claim, a court must first look to the evidence in 
the public record regarding the patent: the claims of the patent, 
the specification of the patent, and the record of the application 
at the USPTO, known as the prosecution history.
 
70 This subset 
of evidence has been called the intrinsic evidence.71 Any other 
evidence, such as treatises, dictionaries, expert testimony, or 
inventor testimony, is deemed to be extrinsic evidence.72
 
 67. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent 
Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District 
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construc-
tion More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); Kimberly A. 
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Inter-
pretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes 
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent 
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in 
Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737 (2011); R. Polk Wagner & 
Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment 
of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004). 
 A 
companion rule of claim construction permits a court to consult 
extrinsic evidence to educate itself, but forbids the court from 
using that evidence to contradict the intrinsic evidence if the 
 68. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 69. See Retractable, 659 F.3d at 1370 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of 
petition for rehearing en banc) (characterizing the claim construction rules as 
“ill-defined and inconsistently applied, even by us,” and suggesting that the 
rules have led to “frustrating and unpredictable results for both the litigants 
and the trial court”).  
 70. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. 
 71. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996).  
 72. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  
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intrinsic evidence is unambiguous.73 Additional rules build on 
this framework. For example, one rule provides that a claim is 
to be given its “ordinary meaning” unless the patentee offers a 
unique definition, either explicitly in the specification or implic-
itly by disavowing subject matter in the specification or the 
prosecution history.74 Another rule attempts to mediate be-
tween forms of intrinsic evidence, prohibiting a court from im-
porting limitations into the claim from the specification or the 
prosecution history.75 In addition to these basic precepts, courts 
may invoke a multitude of other canons of claim construction.76
Under the framework proposed in this Article, the sheer 
complexity of these claim construction rules is not necessarily 
problematic by itself. However, rule complexity becomes prob-
lematic when proximity is also unfavorable, because it produces 
the “Quadrant IV” problem that we have previously discussed. 
And claim construction rules present a massive proximity prob-
lem, because those rules are purportedly directed to the “pub-
lic,” to whom the rules are to provide “notice.” This is a monu-
mental aspiration. Claims are verbal recitations that are all 
but meaningless to the “public,” if by that we mean the general 
public. Sitting by designation at the district court level, Judge 
Posner offered this trenchant critique of the litigants’ proposed 
claim constructions: 
  
[M]any of the proposed claims constructions are not in language intel-
ligible to jurors . . . . There is no point in giving jurors stuff they won’t 
understand. The jury (actually juries) will not consist of patent law-
yers and computer scientists or engineers unless the parties stipulate 
to a “blue ribbon” jury; I would welcome their doing so but am not op-
timistic.77
Moreover, to say that claims give meaningful notice to the pub-
lic is to say that the public not only has a mechanism for dis-
covering the existence of particular claims, but also has the ca-
 
 
 73. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19. But see Holbrook, supra note 62, at 819 
(arguing that the most appropriate time to consult extrinsic evidence is when 
it conflicts with the intrinsic evidence).  
 74. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (discussing the standard applied by the 
court in Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)).  
 75. Id. at 1320. 
 76. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formal-
ism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 144–46 (2005) (cata-
loging the various canons and presumptions in construing a claim). 
 77. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-08540 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 
2012) (Posner, J., sitting by designation) (order regarding claim construction 
briefs). 
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pacity to comprehend and apply the legal rules of construction 
needed to decode those claims.78
This is a useful insight. The audience perspective provides 
a reminder that reforming the law of claim construction need 
not, and probably should not, be exclusively about attempts to 
combat complexity in claim construction rules. Instead, it 
should be about achieving a more favorable proximi-
ty/complexity tradeoff. One way to do that is to develop simpli-
fying heuristics that bridge the distance between the rule-
promulgating institution and the audience. Essentially, the 
goal is to make apparent proximity more favorable while toler-
ating a certain level of complexity.  
  
It might be argued that the Federal Circuit is already fol-
lowing just such a strategy. Claims are said to be directed to 
the hypothetical PHOSITA.79
The analytic move to conjure up a PHOSITA heuristic co-
incides with the types of methodologies that our audience anal-
ysis advocates. But we have many reservations about the Fed-
eral Circuit’s deployment of the PHOSITA heuristic in the 
context of claim construction. First, our analysis contemplates 
that a heuristic such as the PHOSITA will be used instrumen-
tally to solve a serious proximity problem—not merely recited 
by rote as a default objective standard. To work well in the con-
text of our analysis, the PHOSITA construct would need to be 
given real content, contextualized on a case-by-case basis.
 Framed in terms of the audience 
analysis, the PHOSITA may be understood as a legal construct 
that bridges the distance between the formal rules of claim 
construction and the ultimate general public audience. That is, 
the PHOSITA might be visualized as a node on the network di-
agram of the modern patent system shown in the preceding 
section, albeit a hypothetical and amorphous one.  
80
 
 78. Real property boundaries may present analogous problems, but they 
are likely to be far less severe. Real property boundaries may be demarcated 
by physical barriers or other indicia that instantly convey a claim of exclusivi-
ty to the public, and even where they are not, social norms may serve as a re-
liable substitute. 
 
 79. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (“We have made clear, moreover, that 
the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the 
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time 
of the invention . . . .”). 
 80. For discussions about the PHOSITA construct and ways of improving 
it, see Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s 
PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227 (2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person 
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Elaborating the qualities of the PHOSITA would need to be a 
central element of a claim construction analysis, rather than a 
throw-off point. We see little of that in the existing case law. 
Instead, the Federal Circuit frequently seems to ascribe little 
value to the perspective of the PHOSITA in claim construc-
tion.81
Second, the case law causes us to question whether the 
PHOSITA construct is sufficiently durable for improving prox-
imity in the law of claim construction. The Federal Circuit re-
lies on the PHOSITA construct most heavily (at least in claim 
construction) when invoking its “customary and ordinary mean-
ing” rule: that is, the court will seek to determine the custom-
ary and ordinary meaning of the claim language as perceived by 
the PHOSITA.
  
82 But the Federal Circuit has carved out a key 
exception—patent applicants are free to be their own lexicogra-
phers, affording unique definitions to the terms in the claims.83 
The exception can be triggered in either of two ways: when the 
patentee acts as her own lexicographer and offers an express 
definition of a term, or when the patentee unmistakably disa-
vows subject matter through narrowing language and argu-
ments in the specification or prosecution history.84
This is a great deal to ask of a heuristic device, as is evi-
dent from claim construction cases that focus on implicit “disa-
vowal” or other closely-related cases that debate the propriety 
of reading language from the specification or prosecution histo-
ry into the claims. These latter cases in particular have recent-
ly demonstrated the fragility of the Federal Circuit’s current 
approach to the process of claim construction. In Retractable 
Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., the majority lim-
 Effectively, 
the proposition here is that a PHOSITA knows that under  
these two special circumstances, the patentee’s language in the 
specification or the prosecution history trumps the customary 
meaning. 
 
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002); John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous 
and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37, 
37–38 (1991). 
 81  See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technol-
ogy-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185–202 (2002) (discussing flex-
ibility and misapplication of the PHOSITA construct by the courts). 
 82. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. 
 83. Id. at 1316. 
 84. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–
66 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
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ited the claim term “body” to having only one piece, excluding a 
multiple-piece structure.85 Writing for the majority, Judge Alan 
D. Lourie suggested the goal for claim construction is “to cap-
ture the scope of the actual invention, rather than strictly limit 
the scope of claims to disclosed embodiments or allow the claim 
language to become divorced from what the specification con-
veys is the invention.”86 Dissenting, Chief Judge Randall R. 
Rader noted that the claim language should be given primacy 
and, as that language was silent as to the number of pieces, it 
should be read to cover a multi-bodied device.87 The Federal 
Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, but Judge Kimberly 
A. Moore offered a forceful dissent, recognizing the split in the 
court about the appropriate role of the specification in inter-
preting patent claims.88
 
 85. 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 It is not clear to us that resort even to a 
better-elaborated PHOSITA would resolve this split. An engi-
neer or scientist could offer little insight into this linguistic col-
loquy of whether the specification narrowed the legal scope of 
the claim, rendering resort to a fully-fleshed PHOSITA unhelp-
ful. The use of the specification in an estoppel-like surrender 
derives from legal line drawing and analysis, not from the 
 86. Id. Judge Lourie previously advocated such a role for the specification 
in Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1257–58 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The 
bottom line of claim construction should be that the claims should not mean 
more than what the specification indicates, in one way or another, the inven-
tors invented.”).  
 87. Retractable, 653 F.3d at 1312. 
 88. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehear-
ing en banc) (“Retractable illustrates a fundamental split within the court as 
to the meaning of Phillips and Markman as well as the proper approach to 
claim interpretation. I would grant en banc review of Retractable to resolve 
the clear intra-circuit split on the claim construction process.”). Judge Plager 
recently attempted to reconcile these seemingly diverging views, noting that 
they are “complementary,” not antithetical. MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 
672 F.3d 1250, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is an over-simplification to suggest 
that these are competing theories; rather, they are complementary.”). Judge 
Moore, along with Judge O’Malley, would also revisit the current de novo 
standard of review for claim construction. Retractable, 659 F.3d at 1373 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (“I would also grant en banc review in Retractable to 
consider whether deference should be given to the district court’s claim con-
struction.”); id. at 1374 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of petition for re-
hearing en banc) (“It is time to revisit and reverse our decision in Cybor Corp. 
v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).”). The Supreme 
Court, as of this writing, has asked for the Solicitor General’s views on the 
case. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 11-1154, 2012 
WL 2470092 (U.S. June 29, 2012).  
  
2012] PATENT LAW’S AUDIENCE 99 
 
technical aspects of the invention.89
Third, the claim construction cases illustrate how truly hy-
pothetical the PHOSITA is. Real inventors generally do not 
concern themselves with language of surrender and disavowal; 
these linguistic gymnastics are more in the nature of legal ar-
gumentation than a scientifically-driven assessment of the pa-
tent’s disclosure.
 No matter how fleshed out 
the PHOSITA is, her views as a technologist simply will not in-
form what is essentially a legal analysis.  
90 In addition to the examples already cited, 
one might consider the manner in which the Federal Circuit 
uses the prosecution history to inform claim construction. The 
prosecution disclaimer doctrine91 uses the patentee’s represen-
tations at the USPTO against her to narrow the literal scope of 
the claim. The justification for this policy is to “promote[] the 
public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protect[] the 
public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecu-
tion.”92
All of this may boil down to the conclusion that, while we 
need a bridging heuristic for claim construction to deal with the 
proximity problem, the PHOSITA heuristic in its current in-
carnation may not be up to the task. John Golden has arrived 
at a similar conclusion. Golden suggests that claims be inter-
 This presents the same sort of proximity problem that 
we have been discussing, but it is not clear to us that merely 
invoking the PHOSITA in place of the general public, and as-
serting that it is the PHOSITA who would be parsing the pros-
ecution record for disclaimers, is a defensible way forward. Af-
ter all, the court is considering the legal consequence of 
representations made during the prosecution process. The im-
mediate audience for such an assessment is the audience of pa-
tent law sophisticates. It seems to us a stretch to hypothesize a 
PHOSITA that is both conversant in such an assessment and is 
simultaneously a reasonable surrogate for the general public 
audience.  
 
 89. See Holbrook, supra note 76, at 139–44 (discussing the evolution of 
estoppel-like uses of the specification).  
 90. See Holbrook, supra note 62, at 791. 
 91. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). For a summary of the evolution of this rule from cases dealing with 
equivalency under 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 6, to a rule of general ap-
plicability, see Holbrook, supra note 76, at 134–39. 
 92. Omega, 334 F.3d at 1324. For a critique on the use of prosecution his-
tories to assess patent scope, see John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and 
Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim 
Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 200–16 (1999). 
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preted from the perspective of the “interpretive community,” 
which he defines as “the community of people for whom under-
standing patent claims is an important and regular enter-
prise.”93 That is, in his view, the claims’ “primary audience is 
united more by commercial interest and legal duty than by 
technological expertise. A mixture of businesspersons, lawyers, 
USPTO examiners, and judges, this audience consists largely of 
individuals who lack an artisan’s skill in the relevant techno-
logical art.”94 Such community members have a realistic expo-
sure to infringement liability or general interest in avoiding in-
fringement liability.95
In sum, reassessing the claim construction process in 
terms of the framework advocated here persuades us that, at a 
minimum, the Federal Circuit must dispense with the conceit 
that claim construction doctrine effectuates precise notice to 
the general public. The PHOSITA construct potentially could 
be a helpful intermediary between the court and the general 
public, but at present it remains too underdeveloped to effect 
that objective. In the interim, it would be better for the court to 
admit that its claim construction rules are for a limited group 
of sophisticates. The Golden methodology provides a laudable 
step in this direction by recognizing that the members of the 
“interpretive community” are those that have some facility both 
with the relevant technology of a patent and with the doctrines 
dealing with claim construction. These actors then can trans-
late these rules and constructions to the lay audience, their cli-
ents. We believe, however, that there are open questions about 
the extent to which that limited group can successfully convey 
the legal rules and their consequences to the general public or 
even to their immediate audience of business interests.  
 And, of course, these actors, in contrast 
to the general public, are likely to be more proximate to the 
courts. Thus, the audience analysis that we are advocating here 
places Golden’s suggestion in a broader theoretical frame. His 
suggestion can be understood as a design strategy reflecting 
another set of normative choices about the relevant audience 
and the best way to deal with the complexity/proximity 
tradeoff. 
 
 93. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Inter-
pretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 321, 331 (2008). 
 94. Id. at 334. 
 95. Clarisa Long has dubbed such persons “avoiders”—they have no inter-
est in the actual invention or patent but merely want to avoid infringing it. 
Long, supra note 53, at 491. 
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2. Prosecution History Estoppel: The Appearance (and 
Disappearance) of the “Reasonable Competitor” as Audience 
Patents cover not only what they literally claim but also 
devices or processes that are equivalent to the claimed inven-
tion. The determination of what is “close enough” to be an 
equivalent is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that is not a “pris-
oner to formula.”96 The policy underlying the doctrine is to 
avoid strict literalism that would permit others to avoid the pa-
tent easily by making trivial changes to the device.97 The doc-
trine of equivalents therefore avoids potential arbitrage of a pa-
tent that a strictly literalist approach could encourage, and also 
prevents potential, inappropriate obsolescence of the claimed 
invention.98 Because equivalency can create fuzziness around 
the boundaries of a patent, the courts have offered a variety of 
doctrines designed to enhance certainty and predictability re-
garding the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of prosecution 
history estoppel is perhaps the premier limit.99
 
 96. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 
(1950). The courts have articulated at least three tests to assess whether ele-
ments in an accused device are equivalent. For example, the Federal Circuit 
has used the function-way-result test, which requires that the element in the 
accused device “performs substantially the same function in substantially the 
same way to obtain the same result” to be equivalent. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Hon-
da Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit has 
also offered the “insubstantial differences” test. See Lighting World, Inc. v. 
Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But see Warn-
er-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (“[T]he in-
substantial differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might 
render any given difference ‘insubstantial.’”). Finally, courts have also consid-
ered whether the asserted equivalent was known to be interchangeable with 
the relevant claim limitation. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 (“An im-
portant factor [in determining equivalents] is whether persons reasonably 
skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient 
not contained in the patent with one that was.”). 
  
 97. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
731–32 (2002) (“If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their 
value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes 
for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could 
be destroyed by simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule of pa-
tent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not nec-
essarily the most efficient rule.”); Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607 (“[T]o permit 
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail 
would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and use-
less thing.”). 
 98. See Cotropia, supra note 27, at 174. 
 99. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 734 (“Prosecution history estoppel ensures that 
the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose.”). 
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The basic idea behind prosecution history estoppel is that a 
patent owner should not be allowed to reclaim through the doc-
trine of equivalents subject matter that she gave up during the 
prosecution of the patent.100 For example, consider a claim to a 
process that originally contains no limitation as to the pH 
range at which the process runs. If the claim is then amended 
to require that the process be run at a pH of 6.0–9.0, then the 
literal scope of the claim would no longer encompass a process 
running at a pH of 5.0. The patentee would be expected to ar-
gue that a pH of 5.0 is equivalent to a pH of 6.0–9.0 in the con-
text of the claimed process, and the alleged infringer would be 
expected to counter by invoking the doctrine of prosecution his-
tory estoppel, arguing that the patentee should be estopped 
from making an assertion of equivalency on the grounds that 
the patentee is merely attempting to recapture subject matter 
that was surrendered during prosecution.101 The estoppel ar-
gument would presumptively prevail on these facts, but the 
presumption of estoppel is rebuttable, according to the frame-
work established in the Supreme Court’s Festo decision and 
elaborated in many Federal Circuit decisions since then.102 A 
patentee may yet avail herself of the doctrine of equivalents if 
the narrowing claim amendment giving rise to the alleged sur-
render bore only a tangential relationship to the asserted 
equivalent, or if the asserted equivalent was unforeseeable at 
the time of the amendment.103 In turn, additional rules regulate 
the types of evidence that may be used to support these respec-
tive rebuttal arguments.104
 
 100. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 190 F.3d 1335, 1341–42 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that an amendment limiting the claim to two specific 
polymers resulted in estoppel as to other polymers in the “water soluble” 
group, which the accused device used). 
 As a whole, the post-Festo law of 
prosecution history estoppel depends upon a multi-level regime 
of legal rules rather than broadly-demarcated zones of equita-
 101. This example mirrors the situation in Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 
21–23. 
 102. Festo, 535 U.S. at 741; see, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 
1369, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that the presumption of estoppel is 
rebuttable in this “post-Festo era”). 
 103. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740–41. The rationale for permitting rebuttal in 
these circumstances is that one cannot say that the patentee genuinely sur-
rendered the asserted equivalent. As to the former, the patentee presumably 
did not contemplate the equivalent when amending the claim; as to the latter, 
the patentee could not have volitionally surrendered the equivalent because it 
did not yet exist. The Court has also left open the possibility that “other rea-
sons” could serve as a basis for rebuttal. Id. 
 104. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
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ble discretion. It is probably fair to say that prosecution history 
estoppel now has a greater degree of rule complexity. There is 
no question that it is more rule-bound. 
Accordingly, it would be useful to consider how (or if) pros-
ecution history estoppel’s new rule complexity trades off 
against its proximity. Unfortunately, the court’s jurisprudence 
gives little indication that the court has developed any coherent 
notion of the appropriate audience for prosecution history es-
toppel rules, much less any deliberate calculation about prox-
imity.  
Some of the older, pre-Festo Federal Circuit prosecution 
history estoppel decisions displayed at least some marginal 
sensitivity to the question of audience. In these cases, the Fed-
eral Circuit held that whether prosecution history estoppel ap-
plies is determined from the perspective of the “reasonable 
competitor.”105
However, the court’s rhetoric around the reasonable com-
petitor standard in prosecution history estoppel cases has not 
evidenced this sort of deliberation. Instead, the court has ex-
pended more effort apologizing for the reasonable competitor 
standard than it has spent explaining it. In Hoganas AB v. 
Dresser Industries, Inc., the court muddied any distinctions be-
tween the PHOSITA and the reasonable competitor: 
 In our framework, this apparent departure from 
the default PHOSITA heuristic is significant: it could signal a 
determination that statements in a prosecution history, and the 
rules that specify whether those statements will negate equiva-
lents, are designed for a (hypothetical) audience that is more 
expert and more proximate than the PHOSITA. Or, to reframe 
the argument in normative terms, the adoption of a reasonable 
competitor standard might result from an instrumental deter-
mination that prosecution history estoppel rules ought to be de-
signed to speak to an expert audience, but need not attempt to 
put the general public on notice. 
Ordinarily, the test for determining the meaning of a claim term is 
from the vantage point of one skilled in the art. This test would seem 
equally appropriate for determining what subject matter was relin-
quished in the context of prosecution history estoppel. Our precedent 
dealing with this specific question recites that the test is measured 
from the vantage point of a reasonable competitor. We do not see the-
 
 105. See, e.g., Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 
801, 813 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The relevant inquiry is whether a competitor would 
reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject 
matter.”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) (same); see also Golden, supra note 93, at 371. 
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se formulations as necessarily inconsistent—the point is the 
knowledge of one reasonably skilled in the art who views the question 
from the perspective of a competitor in the marketplace.106
Similarly, the court in Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. noted “[i]t is, after all, a competitor who 
is desirous of ascertaining the scope of the claims, but it is one 
skilled in the art who is best able to understand them. None-
theless, the standard is the reasonable competitor stand-
ard . . . .”
 
107
The court’s ambivalent embrace of the reasonable competi-
tor pre-Festo has not set the stage for an enhanced commitment 
after Festo. Instead, the reasonable competitor rhetoric has vir-
tually disappeared.
  
108
We see this most clearly in the fine-grained rules that have 
developed around two of the rebuttal arguments—the “tangen-
tial relationship” argument and the “unforeseeability” argu-
ment. The “tangential relationship” requires a legal assessment 
of what was the prior art, how did the amendment distinguish 
the prior art, and whether the accused device relates to that 
basis for distinguishing the prior art.
 This is especially problematic because the 
course of prosecution history estoppel law has made delineation 
of the audience all the more relevant.  
109 The Federal Circuit has 
ruled that this inquiry is limited to consideration of the intrin-
sic evidence alone; resort to extrinsic evidence such as expert 
testimony is not permitted.110 As the Federal Circuit explained, 
the “reason should be discernible from the prosecution history 
record, if the public notice function of a patent and its prosecu-
tion history is to have significance.”111
 
 106. 9 F.3d 948, 952 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 
 Given that only intrinsic, 
publicly available information is relevant to the inquiry, the 
Federal Circuit has noted that the “tangential relationship” re-
 107. 170 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 108. A search on Westlaw for the term “reasonable competitor” post-Festo 
yielded only one result, and the term “reasonable competitor” was not used in 
the body of the opinion but instead in a parenthetical quotation from a previ-
ous case. See Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1340–
41 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 
172 F.3d 817, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  
 109. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 517 
F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Primos, Inc. v. Hunter's Specialties, Inc., 451 
F.3d 841, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 
F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, 
Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 110. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 
1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).  
 111. Id. 
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buttal is purely legal and reviewed de novo on appeal.112 This 
exploration of the reasons for the amendment and its relation-
ship to the asserted equivalent is not technologically driven; in-
stead, it amounts to a legal conclusion as to whether claim 
scope should be precluded. Notwithstanding the reference to 
the “public” notice function, these rules belong almost exclu-
sively to the domain of lawyers; they speak predominantly to 
patent sophisticates, and only provide notice to the general 
public indirectly, at best. In the terminology that we are using, 
we can probably assume favorable (close) proximity, and there-
fore we can tolerate relatively high rule complexity. Consistent 
with this position, the court might adopt an appropriate heuris-
tic (the reasonable patent lawyer? the reasonable competi-
tor?).113
Unfortunately, the same analysis is not likely to apply to 
the “unforeseeability” rebuttal argument. The question of 
whether an asserted equivalent was unforeseeable at the time 
of the amendment is rooted in a factual, technological inquiry. 
The Federal Circuit has held that it is appropriate, and likely 
necessary, to consider extrinsic evidence in this context and 
that, because fact-finding will be involved, the court may need 
to defer to those findings on appeal.
  
114
By its very nature, objective unforeseeability depends on underlying 
factual issues relating to, for example, the state of the art and the un-
derstanding of a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art at the 
 The court reasoned: 
 
 112. See id. at 1370. 
 113. Argument-based prosecution history estoppel may be subject to a simi-
lar analysis. Prosecution history estoppel is not limited to situations in which 
the applicant amends the claim. It can also arise when, through arguments 
made to the USPTO, the patent applicant unmistakably disclaims claim scope. 
This argument-based estoppel operates identically to the prosecution dis-
claimer rule used in claim construction but, instead of limiting the literal 
scope of the claim, it limits the range of equivalents available under the doc-
trine of equivalents. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 
1326 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We note that [the prosecution disclaimer standard] 
is the same standard applicable, in the context of the doctrine of equivalents, 
to the doctrine of argument-based estoppel and that our precedent has recog-
nized a relation between the doctrines of argument-based estoppel and prose-
cution disclaimer.”). The doctrines are so similar that in no case has the Fed-
eral Circuit found the disclaimer to apply in claim construction but then 
concluded that argument-based prosecution history estoppel did not apply. 
The court itself has recognized that the standards are the same. Id. The idea 
of “surrender” in this context is directed to the legal consequences of argu-
ments made in front of the USPTO, not technically-based historical facts. Ar-
gument-based estoppel therefore operates in a manner akin to the “tangential 
relationship” rebuttal of amendment-based prosecution history estoppel.  
 114. See Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369. 
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time of the amendment. Therefore, in determining whether an alleged 
equivalent would have been unforeseeable, a district court may hear 
expert testimony and consider other extrinsic evidence relating to the 
relevant factual inquiries.115
Indeed, the “unforeseeability” rebuttal argument seems to rest 
on the premise that the prosecution history will convey some 
message directly to a technologist, who will call upon his or her 
expertise to render an essentially technical judgment about 
foreseeability and pattern his or her behavior accordingly.
 
116
Perhaps the dilemma that we have described is simple 
enough to resolve: the court can simply adopt different heuris-
tics for the different rebuttal arguments, explicitly recognizing 
that the rules are designed for consumption by different audi-
ences.
 If 
this is so, then the court’s jurisprudence must account for this 
more distant audience by reducing the complexity of the perti-
nent rules or by invoking robust heuristics that make the ap-
parent proximity more favorable.  
117 That would be a worthwhile interim improvement, but 
we think it highlights a deeper problem with the design of the 
prosecution history estoppel doctrine. Doctrines that are based 
on more familiar forms of equitable estoppel usually require a 
showing of reliance, and generally have arrived at a clear con-
sensus about who the putative reliant party is.118
 
 115. Id. 
 Other forms 
 116. Arguably the Federal Circuit has larded this essentially technological 
judgment with yet more complex legal rules as to foreseeability: an equivalent 
is foreseeable if it existed at the time of the application even if no one would 
have recognized the work as of the date of the application. If the rationale for 
the “foreseeability” approach is that the patentee could have, and should have, 
filed an application that covers foreseeable equivalents, then this test under-
mines that policy objective because, absent such knowledge, the patentee 
would not have been able to claim the asserted equivalent because she would 
not be able to provide an enabling disclosure. See Holbrook, supra note 27, at 
23–26 (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s foreseeability analysis).  
 117. We portray this as simple, but in fact, the court has done virtually 
nothing to date to give content to the heuristics that it has (occasionally) in-
voked. This problem has been especially acute with regards to the “reasonable 
competitor.” At a minimum, it seems that the hypothetical reasonable compet-
itor has some facility with patent law. The court explained that “[t]he deter-
mination of whether an amendment was made for purposes of patentability on 
grounds of obviousness is adjudged from the viewpoint of a person of skill in 
the field of the invention, and when the issue includes consideration of formal-
ities of patent practice, experience in patent law and procedures is presumed.” 
Merck & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 190 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 118. See, e.g., City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 
155 (5th Cir. 2010) (promissory estoppel requires detrimental reliance); 
Goodenberger v. Ellis, 343 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Tex. App. 2011) (easement by es-
toppel requires reliance). 
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of estoppel—such as judicial estoppel—may not expressly re-
quire reliance, but may presume it away in the interest of pre-
serving the integrity of the tribunal.119 There are arguments 
that would map prosecution history estoppel to these tradition-
al forms of estoppel,120 but they all make assumptions about 
audience. We could say that the general public presumptively 
relies on any statement that an applicant makes during prose-
cution,121
3. Disclosure-Dedication Rule and Other Specification-Based 
Doctrines of Surrender 
 or we could say that, as in judicial estoppel, the exam-
iner is presumed to have relied on any such statement. Unfor-
tunately, the court has not engaged in this discussion about 
prosecution history estoppel. We suspect that prosecution his-
tory estoppel jurisprudence will remain conceptually thin until 
that discussion proceeds. 
The public dedication rule is another patent scope doctrine 
that might benefit from closer scrutiny of the complexi-
ty/proximity tradeoff. Under the disclosure-dedication rule, an-
ything disclosed in the patent specification that is not claimed 
is per se dedicated to the public, and the patent owner cannot 
use the doctrine of equivalents to recapture protection of that 
subject matter.122
 
 119. That is, in some instances, it will be presumed that any misrepresen-
tation made before a tribunal will be relied upon by the tribunal. See, e.g., 
Monterey Dev. Corp. v. Lawyer’s Title Ins. Corp., 4 F.3d 605, 609 (8th Cir. 
1993) (“Because the doctrine's focus is on the court's integrity, judicial estoppel 
does not require proof of privity, reliance, or prejudice by the party invoking 
it.”); cf. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001) (judicial estop-
pel requires court to accept party’s earlier position (i.e., rely upon it)).  
 In Johnson & Johnston Associates v. R.E. 
 120. Or, we could conclude that prosecution history estoppel is not “estop-
pel” at all. See Thomas, supra note 92, at 202 (“[E]ven a cursory examination 
reveals that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is entirely misnamed. 
An essential element of estoppel is reliance, a consideration that is wholly ab-
sent in the reported patent decisions.”).  
 121. For hints of this attitude, see Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust 
Co., 311 U.S. 211, 221 (1940) (“The injurious consequences to the public and to 
inventors and patent applicants if patentees were thus permitted to revive 
cancelled or rejected claims and restore them to their patents are manifest.”); 
Leggett v. Avery, 101 U.S. 256, 259–60 (1879) (noting “occasion of immense 
frauds against the public” when formerly abandoned claims are revived).  
 122. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). For a general discussion of the use of the specifica-
tion to limit equivalents, see Holbrook, supra note 76, at 139–44. The Federal 
Circuit has also used the specification to narrow the availability of the doc-
trine of equivalents in circumstances that do not directly involve a disclosure-
dedication issue, but may involve, for example, a specification that disparages 
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Service Co., which involved printed circuit boards, the specifica-
tion stated that “[w]hile aluminum is currently the preferred 
material for the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel 
or nickel alloys may be used.”123 However, the claims expressly 
called for “a sheet of aluminum.”124 This was a clear instance of 
disclosing subject matter (alternatives to aluminum) without 
claiming it, according to the Federal Circuit.125 By looking to 
the claim to define the scope of the right to exclude, and by 
treating the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter as having 
been dedicated to the public, the court asserted that it was up-
holding the public notice function of claims.126 Elaborating on 
the meaning of the public notice function, the court declared 
that the claims “give notice both to the examiner at the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution, and to the 
public at large, including potential competitors, after the patent 
has issued.”127
It would seem easy enough to apply a complexity/proximity 
calculus to the disclosure-dedication rule as enunciated in 
Johnson & Johnston: this is a simple rule that therefore can 
reasonably be directed to a diffuse and distant audience. But 
this assessment is surely incorrect. The disclosure-dedication 
rule is terrifically complex in application. To elicit what has 
 
 
or otherwise surrenders an asserted equivalent. See, e.g., SciMed Life Sys., 
Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1380–
81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (failure to perform unclaimed but disclosed “back-up func-
tion” precludes equivalency). The application of these narrowing strategies in 
the context of equivalents seems correlated to the court’s conclusions about 
how to construe a particular claim. Generally, when the court narrows the lit-
eral scope of the claims pursuant to the specification in the course of claim 
construction, the court also will find that the patentee is precluded from using 
the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home 
Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We have held that when a 
specification excludes certain prior art alternatives from the literal scope of 
the claims and criticizes those prior art alternatives, the patentee cannot then 
use the doctrine of equivalents to capture those alternatives.”). But see 
Holbrook, supra note 62, at 806 n.169 (criticizing this per se preclusion of the 
doctrine of equivalents). The one exception to this rule has been when the as-
serted equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the application. See Abraxis 
Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1376–78 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); see also Holbrook, supra note 27, at 26–27 (discussing the implica-
tions of Abraxis).  
 123. 285 F.3d at 1055. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1052. 
 127. Id. 
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been dedicated, one must be able to determine what is claimed, 
what is disclosed, and how the two correlate. As we have al-
ready discussed,128 claim construction alone is a formidable 
task, implicating proximity concerns, and the rules for deter-
mining what is disclosed in a patent specification are even 
more complex.129
The Federal Circuit’s case law applying the disclosure-
dedication rule hints at these struggles. In PSC Computer 
Products, Inc. v. Foxconn International, Inc.,
  
130 the claim at is-
sue recited “an elongated, resilient metal strap,” one element in 
a claimed retainer clip for a heat sink assembly used in making 
semiconductors.131 The disclosure stated that “other resilient 
materials may be suitable for the strap,” and it also stated that 
“[o]ther prior art devices used molded plastic and/or metal 
parts that must be cast or forged which again are more expen-
sive metal forming operations.”132 The disclosure-dedication is-
sue was whether these statements dedicated the alternative 
use of plastic parts to the public—or whether, indeed, they ded-
icated to the public everything except the use of “resilient met-
al.”133
The court reverted to the PHOSITA heuristic in reformu-
lating the disclosure-dedication rule: 
 
  We . . . hold that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand 
the unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written descrip-
tion, the alternative matter disclosed has been dedicated to the pub-
lic. This “disclosure-dedication” rule does not mean that any generic 
reference in a written specification necessarily dedicates all members 
of that particular genus to the public. The disclosure must be of such 
specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the sub-
ject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed.134
 
 128. See supra Part III.A.1 (regarding claim construction and the 
PHOSITA as a constructed audience). 
 
 129. See infra Part III.A.4 (discussing disclosure doctrines from an audi-
ence perspective). 
 130. 355 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 131. Id. at 1355. 
 132. Id. at 1356. 
 133. Id. at 1357. 
 134. Id. at 1360. The court elaborated on the public notice function of the 
patent document: 
Suitable notice to the public, however, requires that the public under-
stand the language of both the claims and the written description. We 
have repeatedly explained that, in the absence of a compelling reason 
to do otherwise, claims must be interpreted as one of ordinary skill in 
the art would understand them . . . . It thus follows as a matter of 
simple logic that, in the absence of a compelling reason to do other-
wise, the written description must also be interpreted according to the 
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The court then characterized the “other resilient materials” 
statement in the specification as a “generic” reference that did 
not give rise to dedication, but decided that the “[o]ther prior 
art devices” statement was more specific and did result in dedi-
cation of plastic materials.135
The court’s decision in Toro Co. v. White Consolidated In-
dustries, Inc.
 We find this outcome defensible, 
but the set of legal determinations entailed in reaching it are 
not simple. As with claim construction rules, we are left won-
dering whether the summoning of the PHOSITA heuristic im-
proves proximity enough to result in an acceptable complexi-
ty/proximity tradeoff. 
136 amplifies our concerns. There, the court devel-
oped a customized rule, applicable only in the context of a dis-
closure-dedication issue, for determining what a patent 
discloses, instead of relying on established statutory precepts 
codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112.137
 Thus, the level of disclosure needed to implicate the disclosure-
dedication rule is different from the level of disclosure required under 
§ 112 to support claims defining the scope of coverage of an invention. 
Indeed, disclosures implicating the disclosure-dedication rule need 
not directly relate to the description of the claimed invention or be 
contained in the “Detailed Description of the Invention” section of the 
patent, but may appear merely in the portion of the patent describing 
the “Background of the Invention.”
 According to the court: 
138
Applying its rule, the court concluded that the patentee had 
disclosed (but not claimed) a separate cover or ring structure 
 
 
understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art. 
  Taken together, then, one of ordinary skill in the art should be 
able to read a patent, to discern which matter is disclosed and dis-
cussed in the written description, and to recognize which matter has 
been claimed . . . . The ability to discern both what has been disclosed 
and what has been claimed is the essence of public notice. It tells the 
public which products or processes would infringe the patent and 
which would not.  
Id. at 1359–60. The court may be commingling notions of the “public” with no-
tions of the PHOSITA here, an analysis that we regard as unhelpful. 
 135. Id. at 1360. 
 136. 383 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 137. See id. at 1334. 
 138. Id.; see also Cent. Inst. for Experimental Animals v. Jackson Lab., 726 
F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047–49 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding sufficient disclosure to 
trigger rule). But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU 
L. REV. 123, 167 (2006) (criticizing this outcome and advocating use of the 35 
U.S.C. § 112 enablement inquiry to measure whether the disclosure is suffi-
cient to trigger dedication). 
  
2012] PATENT LAW’S AUDIENCE 111 
 
based on the fact that the specification included a comment 
disparaging devices that used such a structure.139
In view of the complexity of these rules, it strikes us as fol-
ly to suggest that all of this is an exercise in discerning what 
the specification tells the “public at large” or even the hypothet-
ical person of ordinary skill in the art. However, we are unsure 
whether conjuring up a different heuristic is likely to advance 
the law here. Instead, in this instance, the audience perspective 
may expose a flaw in the central premise of the disclosure-
dedication rule—that is, the premise that it is likely that read-
ers of the patent document will identify information about un-
claimed subject matter at such a level of specificity that the 
reader could rely on that information to shape his or her own 
commercial activities. Outside the simplest case involving dis-
crete embodiments that are expressly disclosed but not 
claimed, we think that this premise rests on unrealistic as-
sumptions about the proximity between disclosure-dedication 
legal principles and the general public audience. If the court 
were to embrace our framework and reduce the rule’s complexi-
ty, the court could simply jettison the public dedication rule ab-
sent a clearly defined, alternative embodiment. The present 
doctrine conflates with claim construction: third parties would 
be mired in the confusion of assessing what the claim covers 
and then determining whether the specification sufficiently 
discloses an embodiment outside of the scope of the construed 
claims. We believe this complexity is not worth the candle.  
  
Alternatively, though less attractively, the court could at-
tempt to speak to a more proximate audience, such as patent 
attorneys and other sophisticates. Such an approach would re-
quire rejection of the PHOSITA construct and instead would fo-
cus on a more legally oriented perspective. Or the court could 
expressly link the rule to the enablement doctrine: an alterna-
tive can only be dedicated to the public if it is enabled by the 
patent but not claimed.140
 
 139. Toro Co., 383 F.3d at 1334. It seems doubtful that such a disclosure 
would have satisfied the requirements of 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 1. 
 Of course, such an approach presents 
the issue of whether the enablement and other disclosure doc-
trines are appropriately constructed from an audience perspec-
tive, which we take up next.  
 140. One of us has previously advocated for this approach. See Holbrook, 
supra note 138.  
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4. Patent Disclosure Rules 
In order to obtain a patent, an applicant must disclose her 
invention in a manner sufficient to describe and allow others to 
practice the invention without undue experimentation.141 The 
disclosure obligations represent the “quid pro quo” of the patent 
system: in order to obtain the exclusive rights of a patent, the 
inventor must disclose her invention to the public in a manner 
sufficient to allow others to practice the invention based on the 
patent.142 By compelling disclosure, the patent system aspires 
to carry out a teaching function: to inject information about the 
workings of the invention into the general storehouse of 
knowledge, thereby advancing innovation.143 Over time, the dis-
closure rules have also been called into service in other ways. 
They have been invoked to provide assurance that the scope of 
the patent rights correlates reasonably with the scope of the in-
ventor’s contribution (as measured through the patent disclo-
sure).144
 
 141. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a writ-
ten description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”). 
 They also have been deployed for essentially eviden-
 142. See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 
1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the court put it, 
[t]he information in patents is added to the store of knowledge with 
the publication/issuance of the patent. An important purpose of the 
system of patents is to negate secrecy, and to provide otherwise un-
known knowledge to the interested public . . . . In turn, the subject 
matter of patents may be investigated and verified and elaborated; 
the technological/scientific contribution to knowledge is not insulated 
from analysis, study, and experimentation for the twenty years until 
patent expiration. This quid pro quo is fundamental to patent sys-
tems. The statutory requirements of description, enablement, and 
best mode, implement this policy, for these requirements facilitate 
understanding and elaboration of the inventor's contribution.  
Id. 
 143. Once the patent expires, the disclosure permits others to freely copy 
the claimed invention. But even during the patent term, others can learn from, 
improve upon, and design around the patented invention. Id. at 1072–73 
(“Were such information prohibited from study until patent expiration, not on-
ly would the advance of science be slowed, but the design-around of patented 
subject matter would be inhibited, if not excluded, if a new design could not be 
derived from study of the old.”). Some commentators have called the quid pro 
quo theory into doubt. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of 
Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010); Note, The Disclo-
sure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 
(2005). 
 144. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 
F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“‘The scope of the claims must be less 
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tiary purposes, to corroborate (through the patent disclosure) 
that the inventor completed the conception of the invention.145
In striving to satisfy these multifarious ambitions, the 
Federal Circuit has authored a convoluted jurisprudence of pa-
tent disclosure rules. The Federal Circuit has found three dis-
tinct disclosure requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 
1: written description, enablement, and best mode.
  
146 While the 
best mode requirement arguably has become a dead letter as a 
result of legislative changes in the America Invents Act,147 dis-
tinguishing between the remaining two requirements—
enablement and written description—remains a matter of con-
siderable difficulty, even though the issue was fully ventilated 
by the Federal Circuit en banc.148
 
than or equal to the scope of the enablement’ to ‘ensure[] that the public 
knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commen-
surate with the scope of the claims.’”). For example, an inventor who finds a 
vaccine for one particular type of RNA virus is not necessarily entitled to claim 
a vaccine against all such viruses, such as HIV, because she has not demon-
strated how to make or use such a broad genus of vaccines. See In re Wright, 
999 F.2d 1557, 1562–64 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 Even the staunchest propo-
nents of separate enablement and written description require-
ments would surely concede that the jurisprudence is among 
patent law’s most complex, and perhaps among the most re-
sistant to simplification, despite an abundance of efforts, both 
 145. See In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that 
an affidavit under Rule 132 “establishes conception”). 
 146. See Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that, if one exists, the inventor must disclose the 
best mode of practice); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 
1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding written description and enable-
ment to be separate requirements). 
 147. With the enactment of the America Invents Act in September 2011, 
the best mode requirement is no longer a basis for invalidating or rendering a 
claim unenforceable. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–
29, § 15(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 35 U.S.C. § 282(3)) (amending 35 
U.S.C. § 282 to state, “the failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis 
on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise 
unenforceable”). This amendment took effect “upon the date of the enactment 
of this Act [September 16, 2011] and shall apply to proceedings commenced on 
or after that date.” Id. at § 15(c). 
 148. We have given our views on these difficulties at great length else-
where, and we are fairly certain that no one wants them repeated again here. 
Those who do should consult Brief of Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 2–3 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008–1248), 2009 WL 3657814, (argu-
ing that written description and enablement are not separate requirements 
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1). 
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judicial and academic, to more clearly elucidate the disclosure 
rules.  
Without intending to dismiss continuing efforts to reduce 
rule complexity in the patent disclosure rules,149 courts might 
instead devote more attention to offsetting that complexity by 
making proximity more favorable. The law has made a start at 
doing so, albeit rather a feeble one. The statute already pro-
vides that for purposes of the enablement requirement, the dis-
closure is to be assessed from the perspective of the PHOSITA, 
not the general lay audience.150 Likewise, the Federal Circuit 
has held that whether a patent disclosure complies with the 
written description requirement is to be analyzed through the 
eyes of the PHOSITA.151 It is widely understood that the 
PHOSITA heuristic is important here; assessing disclosures 
from the perspective of the lay public would impose large costs 
on patent applicants.152
 
 149. The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in more recent enablement cases evi-
dences a worthwhile effort to reduce complexity. See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Andrx 
Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“To satisfy the plain lan-
guage of § 112, ¶ 1, ALZA was required to provide an adequate enabling dis-
closure in the specification; it cannot simply rely on the knowledge of a person 
of ordinary skill to serve as a substitute for the missing information in the 
specification.”); Auto. Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 
1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Although the knowledge of one skilled in the art is in-
deed relevant, the novel aspect of an invention must be enabled in the pa-
tent.”). 
  
 150. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (disclosure must be enabling from the perspec-
tive of “person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected”); see also In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 181 (C.C.P.A. 1960) 
(“The descriptions in patents are not addressed to the public generally, to law-
yers or to judges, but, as section 112 says, to those skilled in the art to which 
the invention pertains or with which it is most nearly connected.”), overruled 
on other grounds by In re Kirck, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The Federal 
Circuit abides by this mandate. See Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
647 F.3d 1353, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part) (“The 
relevant test for enablement is whether the specification enables one of skill in 
the art to practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (holding, for purposes of the written 
description requirement, “the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of 
the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that 
the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing 
date”). 
 152. If the law required that the general public be able to read the patent 
and understand the invention based on little more than the patent document 
alone, every patent document would need to be a textbook on elementary con-
cepts in order to satisfy the disclosure requirements. The costs of preparing 
patent applications would increase significantly under such rules. The admin-
istrative and private costs of reviewing patent documents might also rise in 
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In our view, much more needs to be done given the high 
degree of complexity. First, a far more robust incarnation of the 
PHOSITA is needed. We see this occurring on a case-by-case 
basis in some of the enablement cases, largely around debates 
over what extent of experimentation on the part of the 
PHOSITA should be deemed undue.153
Second, for reasons similar to those that we have discussed 
above,
 However, we see virtual-
ly none of it in the written description jurisprudence. 
154 the PHOSITA heuristic may simply be the wrong one 
in cases where the disclosure doctrines are being invoked for 
purposes of checking the scope of a patent. The disclosure doc-
trines in such cases are serving essentially as a fulcrum for a 
legal judgment about claim scope. Such matters are, in the first 
instance, directed to lawyers and other sophisticates who can 
digest the complex doctrines surrounding the relationship be-
tween scope and disclosure. We have no simple solution for re-
formulating disclosure doctrines to account for this insight 
about proximity. We can say that our observations about the 
blended nature of disclosure doctrines—particularly the fact 
that those doctrines are more heavily indebted to law than tra-
ditional accounts admit—align with those of other scholars who 
have commented on the dichotomous nature of the disclosure 
itself.155
Finally, the arguments that we have made apply with even 
greater force in cases in which the disclosure doctrine at issue 
is being used to corroborate that conception of the invention 
 Indeed, reliance on the rhetoric of the PHOSITA may 
do little more than obscure the manner in which the court ac-
tually applies the disclosure doctrines. 
 
view of the need for readers to sift through immense volumes of boilerplate 
technical recitations. 
 153. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc. 687 F.3d 
1377, 1380–84 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 
1371, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–40 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
 154. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.  
 155. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 119–24 (2009) (advocating actual reduction to practice 
requirement); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosures, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 
564–94 (2009) (proposing that patent documents be “layered” with both legal 
and technical portions to target specific audiences); Holbrook, supra note 62, 
at 819–25 (advocating use of presumptions to balance technical and legal com-
ponents of a patent’s disclosure); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of 
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641 (arguing for the inclusion of work-
ing examples in patent documents). 
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was completed.156 It is a fallacy to suggest that by simply sum-
moning up the PHOSITA and denominating the inquiry a ques-
tion of fact,157
5. Audience and Freedom-to-Operate: The Example of Divided 
Infringement Claims 
 the legal analysis approximates an objective, pre-
dictable inquiry driven mainly by technical facts. It is, instead, 
an extraordinarily subtle legal judgment requiring application 
of the rules of conception, folded into the disclosure rules. The 
courts should acknowledge this problem when invoking the 
written description requirement in such a context, and scholars 
should develop alternative heuristics that move the inquiry 
away from mere reliance on the PHOSITA.  
Assessing one’s exposure to patent infringement liability is 
not an intuitive exercise, notwithstanding the patent law’s 
standard rhetoric about the patent document supplying mean-
ingful notice to the public. As the foregoing discussion high-
lights, it is difficult enough to analyze patent scope, which de-
pends on an array of legal determinations that are not 
necessarily evident from the face of the patent document. It is 
then more difficult to analyze whether one’s activities would 
fall within a patent’s properly-delineated scope. This latter 
analysis, the infringement analysis, is nominally a question of 
fact, but calls for the application of a number of legal principles 
that few laypersons have absorbed. 
This phenomenon—which triggers the need for members of 
the public to consult with counsel to determine whether their 
activities tread on the property rights of others—is certainly 
not unique to patent law. Indeed, it is not news, and would 
 
 156. Typically, the written description requirement is the disclosure rule at 
issue in such a case. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1367 
n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In contrast to reduction to practice, conception is a pre-
requisite to an adequate written description.”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that “one cannot describe what one has not 
conceived”). 
 157. Compare Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“‘A determination that a patent is invalid for failure 
to meet the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 is a question 
of fact, and we review a jury's determinations of facts relating to compliance 
with the written description requirement for substantial evidence.’” (quoting 
PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d, 1235, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2002))), 
with Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1366 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[A] test 
becomes no less subjective merely because it asks a fact finder to answer the 
subjective question objectively. This court still asks the fact finder to imagine 
what a person of skill in the art would have understood the inventor to have 
subjectively possessed based on the description of the specification . . . .”). 
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hardly be cause for comment, but for the emergence of an unfa-
vorable trend in patent law, a trend towards injecting more 
complexity into patent infringement determinations without 
much attention to other doctrinal strategies that mitigate the 
complexity. 
The patent statute’s main infringement provision, 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a), places considerable pressure on courts to de-
velop a transparent jurisprudence on infringement. Section 
271(a) is a strict liability provision, and it reaches virtually any 
unauthorized act of exploitation of a claimed invention, includ-
ing mere uses. For example, a consumer who carries out a rou-
tine task on a smartphone may well be using inventions 
claimed in dozens of patents. If the smartphone manufacturer 
has incorporated those inventions without a license, the con-
sumer’s use, even if innocent, may well constitute an act of in-
fringement. In terms of the analysis that we have set forth 
here, this scenario is important because it presents a potential 
proximity concern: the patent infringement rule binds a diffuse 
audience of patent law outsiders. Accordingly, patent infringe-
ment rules that entail even moderate levels of complexity are 
likely to stray from the preferred balance of complexity and 
proximity in our calculus.  
The controversy over so-called “divided” infringement illus-
trates the trend towards unmitigated complexity in modern pa-
tent infringement analysis.158 To understand the controversy, it 
is helpful to understand the corollary debate over what consti-
tutes an act of infringing “use” of a method invention, as con-
trasted with a system invention. Under the Federal Circuit’s 
case law, in order for an actor to be liable for infringing use of a 
method invention under § 271(a), the actor must (ordinarily) 
carry out all of the steps of the claimed method.159 By contrast, 
an actor can be liable under § 271(a) for infringing use of a sys-
tem invention even if the actor does not control all of the ele-
ments of the system, as long as there exists some entity that 
maintains control over the system as a whole and receives a 
benefit when the system is used.160
 
 158. See generally Mark. A. Lemley, et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 
AIPLA Q.J. 255, 256–63 (2005). 
  
 159. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); BMC Inc. v. Paymentech, 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir 2007), 
overruled on other grounds by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 
No. 2009-1372, 2012 WL 3764695 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (per curiam). 
 160. See Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Comms. Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 
1279, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 
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In a series of cases, many involving patents on Internet-
based methods, the method claims were drafted in a way that 
called for multiple actors each to participate in carrying out se-
lected steps of the method.161 Collectively, all of the steps were 
performed, but no single actor performed all of them, present-
ing a question about whether any given actor could be deemed 
to have engaged in an act of unauthorized use of the patented 
method. To resolve the question, the court ruled that if one ac-
tor is the agent of another, or is contractually obligated to per-
form the steps of the method, then the court will treat the mul-
tiple actors as a single entity for purposes of discerning an act 
of infringing use.162
The Federal Circuit appeared to be set to reevaluate the 
wisdom of the single-actor rule for method claims (and deroga-
tions from that rule) in two co-pending en banc cases, Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.
 In theory, such a rule again highlights the 
proximity problem, because the Internet-using general public is 
typically one of the multiple actors whose activities are at issue 
in these cases. 
163 and McKesson 
Technologies Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp.164
 
F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court in NTP adopted this rule to deter-
mine the locus of infringement for a system that straddled the United States 
and Canadian border; the court extended this rule for wholly domestic in-
fringement in Centillion. See Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1284. For criticisms of 
both the bifurcation of methods and systems claims and of the “control and 
beneficial use test,” see Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent 
Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2153, 2158–59 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he 
bifurcated approach to explaining the ‘use’ of an invention belies the clear 
statutory structure. There is no reason that ‘use’ of a method should be viewed 
as different from the ‘use’ of a system” and criticizing the “control and benefi-
cial test” as “fatally ambiguous”). 
 Members of the pat-
ent community expected the court to address the single-entity 
rule, and perhaps eliminate the bifurcated state of the law with 
respect to methods and systems. It also was an occasion for the 
court to revisit these doctrines with an eye on the relevant au-
 161. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 632 F.3d 1292, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311, 1318–
22 (Fed. Circ. 2010), rev’d and remanded, No. 2009–1372, 2012 WL 3764695 
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (en banc); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532 
F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Inc. v. Paymentech, 498 F.3d 1373, 
1378 (Fed. Cir 2007), overruled on other grounds by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc., No. 2009–1372, 2012 WL 3764695 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
31, 2012) (per curiam). 
 162. Akamai, 629 F.3d at 1318–22. 
 163. 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), vacated, 419 Fed. Appx. 989 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
 164. Akamai, 2012 WL 3764695.  
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dience. Instead, the court side-stepped the single-entity issue. 
The court retained the “agency or contractual” obligation test 
for direct infringement of patented methods and did not alter 
the “control or beneficial use” test for infringement of systems. 
Instead, it redefined active inducement of infringement under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).165 Now, “[i]f a party has knowingly induced 
others to commit the acts necessary to infringe the plaintiff's 
patent and those others commit those acts, there is no reason to 
immunize the inducer from liability for indirect infringement 
simply because the parties have structured their conduct so 
that no single defendant has committed all the acts necessary 
to give rise to liability for direct infringement.”166
Under our calculus, the Akamai/McKesson result is a 
mixed blessing. By shifting the analysis to § 271(b) inducement, 
the court reduced the scope of the potential affected audience, 
because § 271(b) liability extends only to those who have 
knowledge of the patent and an intent to induce acts of in-
fringement. As such, the only parties that are liable for induc-
ing such infringement are those that have actively engaged in 
the patent system and have awareness of the patent and a be-
lief that the activity they are inducing is infringing.
   
167
 
 165. Id. at *3–4. There may be some unintended consequences to the 
court’s redefinition of induced infringement. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Po-
tential Extraterritorial Consequences of Akamai, EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2154277 (noting that, because § 271(b) has no territorial limits, the court may 
have expanded the reach of patents over methods that straddle national bor-
ders). 
 Such ac-
tors must be quite familiar with the patent system and law to 
form such an intent. They are not terribly remote from the 
courts; the court therefore made the law here more proximate 
to it. The use of active inducement, therefore, is a gain in prox-
imity, in our terms. As a practical matter, the gain may be con-
 166. Akamai, 2012 WL 3764695, at *4. 
 167. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) 
(holding “that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that 
the induced acts constitute patent infringement”); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS 
Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) 
(required to induce infringement, as opposed to induce the acts constituting 
infringement, for liability under § 271(b)). Of course, the lack of the requisite 
intent and knowledge would seemingly only preclude damages; such inducers 
could still be subject to an injunction of they continue activity after the suit is 
filed. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 
22 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 407 (2006); Jason A. 
Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1575, 1603 n.162 (2011). 
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siderable, if, as we suspect, many future cases of this type will 
be framed as inducement cases. 
On the other hand, the court’s approach leaves intact the 
complexity associated with the agency/contractual obligation 
test for § 271(a) infringement of method claims, and the con-
trol/beneficial use test for § 271(a) infringement of system 
claims, and does nothing to improve proximity. This bifurcated 
approach does little to afford better notice to the public. It as-
sumes that the public would be aware not only of the dichoto-
mous case law but also of whether the claims in a particular 
patent cover a method or system. Thus, courts could reconsider 
the entirety of this doctrine with a focus on enhancing proximi-
ty through the use of heuristic. In other words, the courts may 
want to address the issue of divided infringement from the per-
spective of an intermediary. Our ubiquitous intermediary, the 
PHOSITA, would not seem appropriate as “single-entity” doc-
trine and “control and beneficial use” test are not tied to tech-
nological know-how. The use of a “reasonable patent attorney 
or litigator” would also be ill-fitting because these doctrines do 
not have their genesis in patent law but instead are creatures 
of tort law. Under the current law, even patent law sophisti-
cates may struggle to understand the nuances involved in as-
sessing whether these standards have been met, though one 
would expect that such sophisticates would come to learn more 
about the application of agency principles over time. 
 In sum, our proximity/complexity matrix is useful here as a 
new way to frame the divided infringement problem. It may al-
so be useful as a design tool to the extent that it focuses deci-
sion-makers on the benefits of achieving more favorable prox-
imity. 
B. PROXIMITY AND EX ANTE INCENTIVES IN PATENTABILITY 
DOCTRINES 
The complexity/proximity tradeoff also has implications for 
the formulation of patentability doctrines. We focus here on the 
statutory bars to patentability—rules that bar patent protec-
tion for inventions that have been the subject of certain disclo-
sures or sales occurring before the application filing date. There 
are three reasons for choosing the statutory bars. First, the 
statutory bars have traditionally been of immense practical 
significance in patentability assessments, both in ex parte 
prosecution and in assessments of validity after patent issu-
ance. Second, they are tied closely to the ex ante incentives that 
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the patent system purports to provide. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the patentability rules (of which the statutory bar 
provisions are a subset) have just undergone the most compre-
hensive structural reform in the history of the U.S. patent sys-
tem.168 This reform has eliminated the invention-date provi-
sions and has reformulated and restated the statutory bar 
provisions.169
1. The On-Sale Bar to Patentability 
 Courts will soon begin conforming the existing pa-
tentability case law to these amended provisions. This is a 
unique opportunity for the Federal Circuit to reexamine and re-
fine its statutory bar jurisprudence. The audience analysis—
and particularly its insistence on consciously accounting for the 
complexity/proximity tradeoff—offers one framework for carry-
ing out this exercise, as we discuss.  
Inventors can only receive a patent if their inventions are 
novel and nonobvious relative to what is already known, re-
ferred to in patent parlance as the prior art.170 Under the 1952 
Patent Act, patentability over the prior art is assessed as of the 
date of invention,171 with a crucial exception: a patent is barred 
if, more than one year before the application filing date, the in-
vention was patented, disclosed in a printed publication, on 
sale, or in public use.172
 
 168. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 
125 Stat. 328 (2011) (providing for patent reform). 
 Under the America Invents Act (AIA), 
 169. These changes convert the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent 
system into a first-to-file system. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the 
America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 22–
24 (2012). 
 170. See id. at 11 (“This new, transparent definition for what qualifies as 
‘prior art,’ which is then used to determine novelty and non-obviousness of a 
claimed invention, sits alongside the three remaining core legal issues of pa-
tent validity.”). 
 171. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless 
. . . the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the in-
vention thereof by the applicant for patent.”); Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 
F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Any suggestion that a document is prior art 
because it appears before the filing date of a patent ignores the requirements 
of section 102(a). Section 102(a) explicitly refers to invention dates, not filing 
dates. Thus, under section 102(a), a document is prior art only when published 
before the invention date.”). 
 172. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless 
. . . the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or 
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one 
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.”). 
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patentability is no longer assessed as of the invention date, but 
rather, the filing date of the patent.173
The statutory bar rules—whether in their 1952 or 2011 in-
carnations—are presumed to be closely tied to the ex ante in-
centives that the patent grant purports to provide. To invoke 
but one familiar example, the ex ante “incentive to invent” the-
ory of patent law suggests that the promise of patent protection 
will induce would-be innovators to engage in the inventive en-
terprise because they know they will be able to recoup their 
sunk, fixed research and development (R&D) costs over the life-
time of the patent by exploiting the patent’s exclusionary pow-
er.
  
174
An operative assumption—too frequently overlooked—is 
that the statutory bar rules actually communicate these incen-
tives effectively, meaning that they communicate to the audi-
ence of relevant decision-makers, at a point in time to affect a 
decision whether to invest effort and resources in invention. In 
at least some settings, and perhaps many settings, this is pure 
fantasy. The rules purport to speak to an audience that encom-
passes anyone who might become an innovator, before they 
have committed resources to developing an innovation. Moreo-
ver, at least under the incentive-to-invent theory, the pertinent 
 However, where the information embodied in an invention 
is already accessible to the public, or is already the subject of 
commercial dealings, the social welfare losses from a patent 
grant would exceed the gains, and, in theory, the patent system 
should not encourage investments in such inventive activity. 
Thus, the statutory bar rules play a crucial role in shaping the 
patent incentive to serve the patent system’s instrumental 
goals. 
 
 173. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(b)(1) (amending 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) effective March 16, 2013) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent un-
less: (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publica-
tion, or in public use, on sale, other otherwise available to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .”). Under the AIA, a signifi-
cant change is that third party sales and uses are not subject to the one-year 
grace period and automatically render the patent unpatentable. Id.  
 174. See Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1855, 1892 (2012) (“The incentive-to-invent theory is the classic justifi-
cation for the patent system. Under this theory, patent law incentivizes the 
creation of inventions by giving the inventor a mechanism by which she can 
recoup her development costs: exclusivity. The incentive to-invent theory as-
sumes the exclusive rights to the invention allow the inventor to price the in-
vention more like a monopolist, thus above marginal cost. The potential for 
this additional revenue is what entices a would-be inventor to try to invent.”). 
See generally Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1024–28. 
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incentives purport to operate before the inventor even under-
takes the inventive activity, and presumably long before the in-
ventor actually consults with a patent attorney or other sophis-
ticated intermediary who can translate raw patent law rules 
into particularized action items guiding prospective R&D activ-
ity. In addition, the patent system cannot necessarily rely upon 
social norms as mechanism for conveying the requisite incen-
tives message. Absent special circumstances,175 it is not clear 
that relevant social norms exist, or are embedded to an extent 
comparable to other areas of law.176 As the Lough case demon-
strates, inventors of reasonable intelligence, operating in ap-
parent good faith may be utterly unaware of the arcane rules 
that govern whether an inventor is entitled to patent protec-
tion.177
The law as currently formulated falls far short, indulging 
in some refinements in the name of enhancing “certainty” but 
ignoring the proximity problem. Consider, for example, the on-
sale bar case law. The Supreme Court, addressing the legal 
standard for when an invention should be considered “on sale” 
under § 102(b) of the 1952 Act, discarded the Federal Circuit’s 
“totality of the circumstances” test as insufficiently certain, and 
instead substituted a two-part standard: an invention is “on 
sale” if the product is (1) “the subject of a commercial offer for 
sale,” and (2) of subject matter that is “ready for patenting.”
 This is surely one of patent law’s most severe proximity 
problems. The need for robust bridging heuristics, and/or for 
restraint against rule complexity, is paramount. 
178
 
 175. These circumstances could include an experienced inventor drawing 
on past experience (such as past consultations with patent lawyers), or a cor-
porate R&D group drawing upon general norms embedded in corporate culture 
through periodic educational efforts undertaken by in-house counsel. 
 
The Court left no doubt that it expected inventors to be capable 
of decoding this rule, noting that “[a]n inventor can both under-
 176. For example, contrast intellectual property law with criminal law. 
Many aspects of the criminal law may be considered to coincide roughly with 
social norms, so there is a level of compliance among the general population 
that arises even absent actual awareness or decoding of the formal law. See 
Jeanne M. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 25) (on file with authors) (“This view 
of the harmonious interaction on law and norms has important implications 
for intellectual property laws with regard to incentive design. Just as criminal 
law can obtain deterrence by imposing retributive punishments that commu-
nally shame offenders, so too can intellectual property laws provide utilitarian 
incentives to create sounding in moral rights.”). 
 177. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(Plager, J., dissenting). 
 178. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998).  
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stand and control the timing of the first commercial marketing 
of his invention.”179
We see many reasons to doubt that the result is a favorable 
tradeoff of complexity and proximity. The first prong of the test 
is more complex than courts have acknowledged. Under the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation, the first prong is met only 
when the commercial activity would constitute a formal offer to 
sell under contract law.
 
180 The Federal Circuit justified this 
gloss on the Supreme Court’s language on the basis of certain-
ty,181 but we believe that we could identify many first-year law 
students who could confirm that determining what constitutes 
a contract offer is not necessarily an exercise in simple intui-
tion.182 More importantly, such a rule is directed to lawyers (or 
other similarly proximate intermediaries). Few technologists 
would understand the complex inquiries that would be needed 
to assess whether certain commercial activity constitutes a 
formal offer to sell, as opposed to mere “invitations” for offers or 
even offers to buy the invention. Of course, one might argue 
that many patent applicants are corporate inventors183
 
 179. Id. at 67. It seems highly likely the courts will adopt this same defini-
tion for the on-sale activity under the America Invents Act (AIA), given that 
the statute uses identical language to the 1952 Act. For a discussion of the re-
lationship between the on-sale bar under the 1952 Patent Act and the AIA, see 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility after Transocean, 61 
EMORY L.J. 1087, 1112 (2012). 
 whose 
employers may be repeat players with sophisticated legal staffs 
that help translate patentability rules to them. But others are 
 180. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254–55 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat 
of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and 
Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringe-
ment, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 764–84 (2003) (discussing and criticizing 
the formal commercial offer standard on audience grounds). 
 181. Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“Applying established concepts of contract law, rather than some more 
amorphous test, implements the broad goal of Pfaff, which, in replacing this 
court’s ‘totality of the circumstances’ test with more precise requirements, was 
to bring greater certainty to the analysis of the on-sale bar.”). 
 182. See generally Lucas S. Osborne, ‘Offers to Sell’ as a Policy Tool, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026941 (deconstructing the meaning of the 
traditional contract-law “offer”). 
 183. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An 
Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101 
(2000) (finding more than 80% of patents are assigned to companies). Never-
theless, 20% of patents are not, meaning that there is a substantial number of 
inventors operating without necessarily ready access to patent attorneys dur-
ing the inventive process.  
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not, and, as the Lough case illustrates, they are equally bound 
by the rules.184 Moreover, by framing the first prong in a man-
ner that could only be comprehensible to sophisticates,185 the 
Federal Circuit’s approach is in tension with the Supreme 
Court’s apparent preference for fashioning a rule for the inven-
tor community.186
The second prong of the on-sale bar test also highlights the 
problem with the on-sale bar in terms of the complexi-
ty/proximity tradeoff. The Supreme Court noted that, to trigger 
the on-sale bar, the invention must be “ready for patenting.”
  
187 
An invention is “ready for patenting” when the inventor has ei-
ther built a working embodiment (a reduction to practice) or 
prepared diagrams or descriptions sufficient to enable a person 
of ordinary skill to make the invention.188 Generally, the deci-
sion of whether an invention is complete enough to warrant a 
patent application is assessed by a patent attorney. This is 
quite similar to the proximity problem that we identified in 
previous sections where a rule depends upon construction of 
the patent specification.189
Our audience analysis, then, places the complexity and 
proximity problems with the on-sale bar into sharper focus. It 
does not point ineluctably to a quick solution to those problems. 
Regarding the proximity problem, we are skeptical that simply 
integrating the PHOSITA more fully into the on-sale bar test 
will bring the test more in line with its apparent aspiration of 
communicating directly to would-be inventors. Such a move 
might improve the transparency of the second prong, but would 
do little or nothing for the first. As for the complexity problem, 
we regard the Court’s two-pronged test as having reduced com-
plexity only marginally,
 
190
 
 184. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(Plager, J. dissenting). 
 but we are not prepared here to pro-
 185. The Federal Circuit’s interest in certainty is addressed to the courts, 
not necessarily to actors in the patent system. See Grp. One, 254 F.3d at 1047 
(“Courts are quite accustomed to and comfortable with determining whether a 
particular communication or series of communications amounts to an offer in 
the contract sense.” (emphasis added)). 
 186. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). 
 187. Id. at 67–68. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See supra Section III.A (discussing the proximity/complexity problem 
with patent scope doctrines). 
 190. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They 
Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest 
for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 960 (2000) 
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pose a better alternative. Our instinct is that on-sale bar juris-
prudence is in need of concurrent efforts to continue to reduce 
complexity (perhaps by articulating and experimenting with 
inventor safe harbors, for example) while also addressing the 
proximity problem through the use of the PHOSITA or other 
means. 
2. The Public-Use Bar to Patentability and the Experimental-
Use Negation 
The jurisprudence of the public-use bar of § 102(b) of the 
1952 Patent Act (which is likely to be taken up, in large part, 
for purposes of analyzing the use bar of § 102(a) of the AIA), 
likewise does not hold up well when analyzed in terms of the 
complexity/proximity tradeoff. Unlike the on-sale bar, which 
frequently presents hard questions about whether the subject 
matter at issue was ready for patenting,191 the public-use bar 
typically revolves around questions about whether the use at 
issue should be deemed public. In some cases, this question can 
be resolved intuitively based on common sense indicia of public 
accessibility, such as whether the use was undertaken in a pub-
lic place, or whether the use was visible to the public. However, 
in other cases, including some early, now-famous cases, courts 
declared uses to be public based primarily on policy assess-
ments rather than any accessibility calculus. For example, in 
Egbert, the Court found a use public because it considered the 
inventor to have relinquished control over a prototype of the 
invention, behavior that the Court apparently sought to dis-
courage quite independently of whether the prototypes were 
likely to have been viewed by the public.192
 
(“The myriad of factual circumstances identified by the courts belies the pre-
dictability and the certainty that the Supreme Court had hoped would emerge 
from its new test. Indeed the facts relevant under the ‘ready for patenting’ test 
are very similar to those under the ‘substantially complete’ test.”). 
 In another famous 
case, Judge Learned Hand found a patented method to be in 
 191. Only rarely have the courts even explicitly recited a “ready for patent-
ing” element of the public-use test. But see Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., 
L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring that the use be public 
and that the subject matter be ready for patenting). 
 192. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337–38 (1881) (holding that use of 
invention in undergarments, never exposed to the general public, constitutes 
invalidating public use); see also id. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“If the little 
steel spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by only one woman, 
covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld from public 
observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the 
line between a private and a public use.”). 
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public use by an inventor even when it was kept secret because 
the inventor had commercialized the product of that process.193
Thus, the inquiry of whether use is “public” is potentially 
complex, and this is problematic because, like the on-sale bar, 
the public-use bar purports to influence directly the investment 
decisions of would-be innovators. In fact, our discussion to this 
point understates the complexity/proximity problem, because 
we have not accounted for the experimental-use doctrine, the 
doctrine that was at issue in Lough. Under current case law, if 
the use was directed primarily to experimental activity, then 
the public-use bar is not triggered.
  
194 The Supreme Court, in 
City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., noted 
that “[t]he use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any 
other person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in 
order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been re-
garded as such a [public] use.”195
Perhaps no other doctrine in patent law presents a more 
intractable complexity/proximity problem than does the exper-
imental-use negation of the on-sale and public-use bars. While 
the policies underlying the experimental-use negation are 
probably intuitive even for non-lawyers,
 
196 the law that imple-
ments those policies has become exceptionally difficult to parse. 
The Federal Circuit has advocated the use of thirteen non-
exclusive factors for assessing whether a particular use or sale 
is experimental in nature.197
 
 193. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 Even patent sophisticates would 
 194. See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (discussing experimental-use negation in the public-use bar context). 
The experimental nature of an inventor’s activity could also negate what 
would otherwise constitute an on-sale bar. See, e.g., Electromotive Div. of Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1211–12 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that experimental use in the on-sale bar context ne-
gates the commerciality of the offer). 
 195. 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877). 
 196. The experimental use exception to the statutory bars is designed to 
afford the inventor time to finalize the invention even in circumstances where 
the inventor might derive some incidental benefit from the use and where oth-
ers may be aware of the invention. See, e.g., id. at 135. Without the experi-
mental use safety valve, inventors theoretically would have to race to the 
USPTO to file applications on inventions that are not fully developed and not 
amenable to being disclosed adequately to satisfy the obligations of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 (2006). 
 197. EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (Linn, J., concurring). The court identified the following thirteen factors: 
(1) the necessity for public testing; (2) the amount of control over the experi-
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have difficulty predicting whether a particular use would quali-
fy as “experimental,” let alone a technologist unfamiliar with 
patent doctrine. Judge Lourie’s characterization of the public-
use analysis confirms that this doctrine is far up on the com-
plexity axis: 
  With respect to both public use and experimental use, courts have 
been accustomed to referring to their determinations as involving “the 
totality of circumstances,” a phrase that some have objected to as be-
ing indefinite. What this phrase conveys is simply the process by 
which judges decide legal issues based on various facts that have been 
determined, utilizing the tools that judges always use, viz., the lan-
guage of the statute, the purposes of the statute as indicated by legis-
lative history, etc. Cases depend on facts, but they involve legal judg-
ments.198
The Lough case epitomizes the disconnect between the 
complexity of the law and the distant audience of inventors. As 
Judge Plager explained in his dissent in Lough:  
 
  Of course it would have been better for all . . . if Mr. Lough had 
read our prior opinions before he became an inventor. Then he might 
have kept detailed lab notes setting out the problem and the possible 
solutions, and he wisely would have obtained written confidentiality 
agreements from those allowed to see or use his prototypes. Had he 
studied our cases first, he no doubt would have developed a detailed 
questionnaire for the persons to whom he provided the seals, and he 
would have insisted on periodic written reports . . . . Instead, he did 
what seemed appropriate in the setting in which he worked: he wait-
ed to hear from his test cases what problems might emerge, and, 
hearing none, at least none that convinced him he was on the wrong 
track, he accepted some friendly advice and proceeded to patent his 
invention . . . . Yes, he failed to conduct his testing, his experiments, 
with the careful attention we lawyers, with our clean and dry hands, 
have come to prefer.199
To us, Lough’s acts are quite plausibly experimental, espe-
cially if viewed from the perspective of an inventor who is una-
ware of the complexities of patent law. Indeed, the jury also 
 
 
ment retained by the inventor; (3) the nature of the invention; (4) the length of 
the test period; (5) whether payment was made; (6) whether there was a secre-
cy obligation; (7) whether records of the experiment were kept; (8) who con-
ducted the experiment; (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during test-
ing; (10) whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation under actual 
conditions of use; (11) whether testing was systematically performed; (12) 
whether the inventor continually monitored the invention during testing; and 
(13) the nature of contacts made with potential customers. Id.; accord Allen 
Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recit-
ing thirteen factors).  
 198. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Lour-
ie, J., concurring in order declining suggestion for rehearing en banc).  
 199. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1124 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
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thought that his acts were reasonable.200 Yet, the court, as a le-
gal matter, refused to find Lough’s activities to be sufficient for 
experimentation. Indeed, Judge Lourie dismissed the audience 
concern, noting “[t]he fact that members of the public may not 
know for certain what a judge or panel of judges may decide on 
a particular matter is hardly a criticism of the system of assign-
ing fact-law labels to issues for decision.”201
In its more recent efforts to deal with the experimental-use 
negation, the Federal Circuit has appeared to lock on to con-
cerns about doctrinal complexity. For example, notwithstand-
ing its fealty to the thirteen-factor test, the court has elevated 
two factors, control and customer awareness, as being more 
equal than the others, designating them as necessary condi-
tions for experimental use.
 We advocate just 
the opposite approach: consideration of the appropriate audi-
ence is crucial to designing an efficiently operating patent sys-
tem, particularly if we expect members of the community to re-
spond to the incentives it purports to provide. 
202
The court’s move to reduce complexity is laudable in prin-
ciple, but we have many reservations about it. First, we are du-
bious about its durability. That these factors are necessary but 
not alone sufficient suggests that courts will draw upon other 
factors perhaps to trump any finding of experimental use. The 
 If an inventor has not exercised 
sufficient control and the customer is not aware of the experi-
mental nature of the use, then there can be no experimental-
use negation, according to this rendition of the doctrine. The 
presence of control and awareness permit a finding of experi-
mental use, though the fact finder would need to consider the 
other factors as well; control and awareness, therefore are nec-
essary though perhaps not sufficient conditions. 
 
 200. Id. at 1118 (“A jury found that Brunswick failed to prove that Lough’s 
invention was in public use before the critical date.”); see also Lough, 103 F.3d 
at 1522–23 (Newman, J., dissenting from order declining suggestion for re-
hearing en banc) (reciting facts and inferences supporting the jury’s verdict).  
 201. Lough, 103 F.3d at 1519 (Lourie, J., concurring in declination of en 
banc review). 
 202. See Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of 
Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Lough, 103 
F.3d at 1526 (Michel, J., dissenting from order declining suggestion for rehear-
ing en banc) (“I would take the case in banc to reaffirm our classification of 
public use as ultimately an issue of law and also to identify certain indicia of 
‘control,’ e.g., record keeping, secrecy agreements, testing protocols, supervi-
sion of testing, reports to the inventor or restricted access to others, proof of 
which should be required before any potentially barring use in public can, on 
grounds of experimentation, avoid the public use bar.”). 
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likely reason for so many factors is that there is an underlying 
equitable impulse that has driven judicial decisions in this ar-
ea. We do not believe that merely elevating two factors will re-
move that impulse. Moreover, and more troubling, we are not 
so sanguine that these two factors are actually more important 
than the others. As to control, there may be circumstances, 
such in the Lough case, where formal control may be lacking 
but informal, social norms may suggest that there was in fact 
experimentation. As to customer awareness, it remains unclear 
to us why this factor has been elevated at all. If the experi-
mental-use doctrine is in essence gauging the level of develop-
ment of the invention, then subjective awareness of the cus-
tomer seems too peripheral. Additionally, it could very well be 
that there is not a customer, at least in the public-use context. 
Thus, customer awareness may have some bearing in negating 
the on-sale bar (where there is at least a proposed transaction 
between two parties); it would appear to have far less relevance 
in the context of the public-use bar. 
Although the court has attempted to make the law less 
complex, we are not convinced that this move will suffice given 
the remoteness of the audience of inventors. We would prefer to 
see the court focus more of its attention on addressing proximi-
ty. The court might begin by dispensing with the fiction that 
the experimental-negation rules as they currently exist are 
comprehensible to inventors themselves, or that those rules di-
rectly shape ex ante incentives in any direct way. This, in turn, 
would make plain the need to develop better heuristics or other 
strategies for rendering proximity more favorable. 
Overall, unlike the ex post considerations of patent scope, 
the statutory bars need to be accessible to a wide spectrum of 
inventors if the incentives of the regime are to operate appro-
priately. While we recognize that the community of innovators 
may need to tolerate a certain level of complexity in statutory 
bar rules, we expect that it will be difficult to refine these rules 
by addressing proximity alone. The public-use bar and the ex-
perimental-use negation, while focused on questions of histori-
cal fact, might be clarified and simplified in a manner to pro-
vide reduce complexity for the relevant audience,203
 
 203. Cf. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 22–
25 (2011) (arguing that lay persons will use heuristics and seek out expert 
opinions, rather than choose to “wrestle with understanding a complex tech-
nology”). 
 even while 
courts simultaneously strive to address the proximity issue. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Our goal in this Article is not to propose any monolithic 
definition of patent law’s audience. Instead, our goal is to point 
out the disconnect between patent law’s presumptuous rhetoric 
about its audience and the reality of the patent system’s insti-
tutions and communications challenges. Our further goal is to 
consider approaches to designing patent law doctrines that 
take into account the disconnect and the challenges. 
One design approach requires that those who craft patent 
doctrine first discard the fallacy that patent law rules are ad-
dressed to the general public (or even to inventors), and recog-
nize that virtually all patent law rules are broadcast to and 
among multiple intermediaries that retransmit (and frequently 
reformulate) those rules for consumption by generalists. The 
roles played by these intermediaries, and their place in the de-
sign calculus for patent law rules, have not been articulated 
sufficiently. Intermediaries might impede communication or 
foster it. They might represent actual persons or institutions, 
or they might constitute convenient fabrications, such as the 
PHOSITA, the “reasonable competitor,” or the “reasonable pat-
ent attorney” heuristics. Regarding the heuristics, a patent law 
jurisprudence that is attuned to patent law’s audience (and the 
complexity/proximity tradeoff) ought to treat the development 
of the PHOSITA and other heuristics as a central design task 
rather than as an afterthought. It should invoke and shape 
these heuristics much more deliberately. It should also recog-
nize that, for some patent rules, the PHOSITA heuristic alone 
may be insufficient to improve proximity between the lawmak-
er and the ultimate audience. 
Ultimately, if the patent law is to operationalize its oft-
stated concerns with providing “public notice,” or with shaping 
incentives for communities of would-be innovators, then patent 
rules must be designed with an eye to communicating with the-
se audiences. A sole focus on reducing rule complexity, taking 
no account of the rule’s proximity to its putative audience, is 
not likely to be productive. 
 
